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ABSTRACT
FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS: DECOMPOSING THE NEURAL AND COGNITIVE
BASES OF SEMANTIC COMPOSITION
Christine Boylan
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill
John C. Trueswell
In this dissertation, I present a suite of studies investigating the neural and cognitive
bases of semantic composition. First, I motivate why a theory of semantic combinatorics
is a fundamental desideratum of the cognitive neuroscience of language. I then introduce
a possible typology of semantic composition: one which involves contrasting featurebased composition with function-based composition. Having outlined several different
ways we might operationalize such a distinction, I proceed to detail two studies using
univariate and multivariate fMRI measures, each examining different dichotomies along
which the feature-vs.-function distinction might cleave. I demonstrate evidence that
activity in the angular gyrus indexes certain kinds of function-/relation-based semantic
operations and may be involved in processing event semantics. These results provide the
first targeted comparison of feature- and function-based semantic composition,
particularly in the brain, and delineate what proves to be a productive typology of
semantic combinatorial operations. The final study investigates a different question
regarding semantic composition: namely, how automatic is the interpretation of plural
events, and what information does the processor use when committing to either a
iii

distributive plural event (comprising separate events) or a collective plural event
(consisting of a single joint event).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why concern ourselves with compositionality?
Language owes its infinite expressive capacity to our ability to take simple
building blocks, such as words or concepts, and combine them into complex
representations. How such conceptual combination might be realized in the brain, and
whether formal accounts of syntactic and semantic composition are useful in
characterizing the neural system underpinning conceptual combination, are still highly
debated questions, and the emergence of compositional meaning from units such as
morphemes, words, or concepts, is largely a mystery. However, understanding the
engine of compositionality in the brain is a fundamental desideratum of any cognitive
neuroscientific model of “concepts.”
This dissertation examines how the compositional system accomplishes
conceptual and grammatical semantic combinatorics along a number of possible
dimensions. We investigate several ways in which a natural dichotomy may exist
between feature-/property-based composition, which concerns attributive modification
operations on concepts, and relation-based composition, which concerns grammatical and
thematic relations between concepts. Chapters 2 and 3 examine two different ways of
characterizing this dichotomy that engage two regions of the brain we describe as
combinatorial hubs: the angular gyrus (AG) and the anterior temporal lobe (ATL).
Chapter 3 details the possibility that event semantics are particularly privileged in the
putative “relation-based” semantic space supported by (left) AG. Chapter 4 investigates a
different question regarding semantic composition: namely, how automatic is the
1

interpretation of plural events, and what information does the processor use when
committing to either a distributive plural event (comprising separate events) or a
collective plural event (consisting of a single joint event).
Attributive vs. relational combination
For one intuitive explanation of the distinction between what we call featurebased and function-based compositional operations, we first look to the literature on
conceptual combination. Here, the distinction is often cast in terms of “properties”
instead of “features,” and “(thematic) relations” instead of “functions,” as in Wisniewski
and Love’s (1998) discussion of two different interpretations of a noun-noun combination
like robin hawk:
One kind of interpretation involved a thematic relation between the referents of
the modifier and head concepts. For example, a robin hawk could mean ‘‘a hawk
that preys on robins.’’ In property interpretations, people asserted that one or
more properties of the modifier concept apply in some way to the head concept,
as in ‘‘hawk with a red breast,’’ for robin hawk. Sometimes these interpretations
refer to an entity which shares many properties of both constituents (e.g., a robin
hawk could refer to a bird that is a cross between a robin and a hawk).
(Wisniewski & Love, 1998, p.178)
A thematic interpretation of robin hawk entails that each entity play a different functional
role (or thematic role): the modifier refers to a robin as the object, or “patient,” of the
action “to prey on,” while the head noun hawk refers the agent of “to prey on.” When
robin hawk is interpreted as a property combination, however, the modifier robin refers
to a property of the robin – e.g. its red breast – rather than the robin itself. The property2

combining interpretation involves no specification of functional roles or argument
structure as does the relational interpretation.
This fundamental distinction between property- or feature-based combination on
the one hand and functional, thematic relation-based composition on the other is
ubiquitous across linguistic and psychological theory, albeit under various different
guises. While chapter 2 uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test how
property-based, or “attributive,” and relational nominal compounds like robin hawk
differentially engage ATL and AG, chapter 3 tests two more ways of operationalizing the
“feature-function” distinction, while still examining ATL and AG as neural substrates.
Adjuncts vs. arguments, and whether verb semantics is privileged in the angular
gyrus
Chapter 3 uses fMRI multi-voxel pattern analysis to test two different hypotheses
about the role of AG in compositional semantics. Our verb-centric hypothesis states that
if AG is preferentially sensitive to event-denoting verbs and their thematic relations, then
phrases that share a given verb (like eats meat and eats quickly) will evoke similar
patterns of activation in AG. Phrase pairs that do not share verb semantics will not
engage similar patterns of activation in AG. We find evidence that the verb is indeed
privileged in AG semantic space.
Another hypothesis asks whether AG may be sensitive to relational information
independent of the verb. The dichotomy between “feature” and “function” has a good
deal of traction in more formal theories of semantics, particularly in the distinction
between what linguists call “adjuncts” and “arguments,” respectively. The difference
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between arguments and adjuncts, however, is more subtle than that between verbs and
non-verbs, and so we unpack the terms a bit below.
Intuitively speaking, the verb is the central predicate of a sentence, and predicates,
such as eat, must be able to take arguments (like meat) in order to participate in wellformed sentences ( Heim & Kratzer, 1998; Pylkkänen, Brennan, & Bemis, 2011). While
the case of verbs and their direct objects is perhaps the most canonical example of socalled “argument saturation”, there are other types of function-argument relations: for
instance, the composition of prepositional phrases (e.g. with meat, where the preposition
with takes the argument meat).
Many well-formed linguistic expressions can be derived merely by iterative
application of arg-type composition; however, there are other sorts of linguistic
expressions it cannot derive. Take, for instance, the following sentence:
(2)

John ate a sandwich quickly in the kitchen.
The semantics of the verb “ate” can be represented as the function ate(x,y), where

x will be the object argument (here “a sandwich”) and y the subject (here, “John”).
Leaving aside the subject argument, we can see that applying argument-type composition
will get us “ate a sandwich,” since it is relatively intuitive that “a sandwich” is an
argument of “ate.” However, it is not so clear that we can derive the meaning of “ate a
sandwich quickly in the kitchen” in terms of argument-type composition alone. In order
for argument-type composition to accomplish this, all three underlined constituents in (2)
above must be arguments of “ate.” However, the case in (3) below shows us that “a
sandwich” does not behave like the other constituents do.
(3)

John ate a sandwich quickly in the kitchen, and
4

(a) Bill did (so), too.
(b) *Bill did (so) a salad.
(c) Bill did (so) slowly.
(d) Bill did (so) in the backyard.
It would seem that there is something about the status of the constituent “a sandwich”
that cannot be left out or replaced (see 3b), while the other constituents “quickly” and “in
the kitchen” can (3c, 3d). This is because the only argument of “ate” in 2-3 is “a
sandwich,” whereas the other underlined constituents are modifier, or “adjunct,” phrases
that modify the predicate “ate.” How do we derive the compositional meaning of these
modifying phrases?
Adjunct-type composition allows us to combine such modifiers with their “heads,”
where “ate” is the head in 2-3, and “in the kitchen” and “at midnight” are the modifiers.
These optional elements serve to further specify features or properties of the head they
modify (while “ate” is an event-denoting element, “quickly” and “in the kitchen” are
when- and where-type properties of that event).
In Chapter 3, we discuss evidence that specifically event-denoting verb argument
structure may selectively engage the AG, while it remains to be seen whether AG and/or
ATL differentiate arguments and adjuncts more generally.

Collective vs. distributive interpretations of plural sets
In Chapter 4, we turn to a different set of questions regarding events and semantic
composition, this time examining the degree to which the decision to interpret plural
events as either distributive (occurring separately) or collective (occurring jointly) might
5

be automatic and immediate, and also whether this decision is biased to be collective or
distributive at certain points along the timecourse of interpretation. Examining sentences
like “John and Bill carried a box,” where this sentence could entail John and Bill each
carrying a separate box (a distributive plural) or John and Bill together carrying the same
box (a collective plural), we ask whether the collective or distributive quality of the
predicate is something the processor can leave underdetermined, or whether the grammar
requires a commitment to one interpretation or the other early on in the sentence.
Using eye-tracking and the visual world paradigm, we tested a hypothesis (Frazier
et al.'s (1999) Minimal Semantic Commitment hypothesis) that distinguishes between
two types of mental representations the processor might entertain upon encountering a
underdetermined semantic constituent (like a plural event that could be collective or
distributive): if the representation is ambiguous, the processor will commit to one of its
interpretations and later revise it if necessary, but if the representation is vague, the
processor refrains from committing to an interpretation, leaving some features
underdetermined until further information is made available. The crucial difference
between these two proposed representation types is that an ambiguous representation
necessitates a decision about an interpretation, while a vague representation tolerates
unspecified features. This is somewhat similar to the notion that adjuncts have an
“optional” status in the grammar, while arguments are elements of the grammar that are
necessary in order for a parse to be successful, as described in the section above.
The following two sentences illustrate a case when a linguistic item can be said to
tolerate “underspecification,” or vagueness:
(4)

a. John ate.
6

b. John ate quickly.
The difference in meaning between (4a,b) resides in the adverb “quickly.” In sentence
(4a), the manner in which John ate is left unspecified, and yet a reader will find sentence
(4a) perfectly interpretable without knowing the manner in which John ate. On the other
hand, if the sentence lacked information specifying other propositional content,
including, for instance, the number (singular) or tense (past) of the verb, this sentence
would be grammatically uninterpretable (forcing a case of ambiguity when the processor
would have to commit to a number or tense even if uncertain). Thus, while some
information about the verb must be determined in order to parse the sentence, other
features ostensibly need not be, as in the case of the adverbial adjunct “quickly” (1b).
Adjunct information, such as the manner in which John ate, is therefore characterized as
vague, rather than ambiguous.
Given the prediction that an ambiguous item will prompt the processor to
converge on one particular interpretation even in the absence of disambiguating
information, chapter 4 seeks to test whether, and when, sentences underdetermined for
collective/distributive plurality will nonetheless immediately converge on one
interpretation. We recorded participants’ eye movements as they interrogated two scenes,
one collective and one distributive, while listening to corresponding sentences either with
or without the early disambiguating adverbs “together” (explicitly indexing a collective
event) and “each” (indexing a distributive event). Experiment 1 queries the timecourse of
interpreting sentences beginning with conjoined noun phrases (conjoined NPs), such as
“John and Bill (each/together) are carrying a box,” while Experiment 2 uses the same
scenes but with sentences starting with simple plural NPs (“The boys (each/together) are
7

carrying a box”). We find evidence that the collectivity/distributivity of NPs like “John
and Bill” and “The boys” is a matter of ambiguity (a grammatically forced, necessary
choice). However, whereas early fixations are biased towards collective scenes in
conjoined NP John and Bill sentences, they are biased towards distributive scenes in The
boys sentences. We discuss possible reasons for this difference in the final section of
chapter 4.

Aims of the dissertation
In this dissertation, I seek to demonstrate the following:
i.

Semantic compositionality can be characterized along a “feature-vs.-function”
dichotomy in several possible dimensions (chapters 2 and 3)

ii.

The AG supports various aspects of function-/relation-based composition, among
them verb-specific argument structure around events (chapter 3) and more general
thematic relation-based composition (chapter 2).

iii.

Semantic decisions on the collective or distributive representation of plural events
occur early on in sentence processing – at the verb phrase – even in the absence of
disambiguating evidence. However, the bias of this decision is largely determined
by the affordances of the subject noun phrase, and not just the verb phrase
(chapter 4).

While we find some evidence for the distinction between feature-based composition and
functional relation-based composition within left ATL itself (see Chapter 2), we find
stronger evidence for at least a single dissociation of relation-based composition in AG.
In chapter 5, we review the several ways we have operationalized such “relation-based”
8

composition, and we consolidate evidence that AG subserves certain of these relationbased operations. We close by reviewing evidence that AG may also be involved in the
representation of plural sets, and we speculate that further study of AG may not only shed
light on relation-based composition, but also on the distinction between distributive and
collective plural sets.

9

II. RELATIONAL VS. ATTRIBUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF NOMINAL
COMPOUNDS DIFFERENTIALLY ENGAGES ANGULAR GYRUS AND
ANTERIOR TEMPORAL LOBE
Introduction
Language’s infinite generative capacity allows us to produce utterances ranging from
the prosaic, as in “Close the door,” to the ridiculous, as in “Hold the newsreader's nose
squarely, waiter, or friendly milk will countermand my trousers” (Stephen Fry, A Bit of
Fry and Laurie). Less ridiculous, but no less novel, sentences are uttered every day, and
the ability of a reader or listener to understand such novel sentences, the propositional
meanings of which cannot be retrieved from memory, requires a compositional algorithm
that takes word meanings and combines them in such a way as to produce a more
complex meaning. The neural substrate of this compositional algorithm remains elusive.
Earlier work sometimes considered this engine of composition a more or less
undifferentiated mechanism working to combine elements at all levels of language,
whether that be syntax, semantics, or phonology (Hagoort, 2005; inter alia). While it is
entirely plausible that the brain co-opted a basic, domain-general combinatory
mechanism for language, and implements it across multiple brain regions, such a
monolithic theory of linguistic composition has its limitations.
For instance, many approaches to the study of composition benefit from a clear
distinction between syntactic and semantic composition. Numerous psycho- and
neurolinguistic studies investigating the syntax-semantics interface have included socalled Jabberwocky phrases, in which nonsense words replace content words while
10

function words remain in place, as semantically vacuous (or at least impoverished)
syntactic controls for linguistic phrases (e.g. “the mouse that eats our cheese” vs. “the
couse that rits our treeve” (example from Pallier, Devauchelle, & Dehaene, 2011).
These studies demonstrate that subjects parse Jabberwocky phrases into hierarchical
constituents similar to their natural language counterparts, even without knowing what
the phrase means. Studies of complement coercion also suggest that syntactic and
semantic argument structures are not isomorphic: evidence from behavioral, eye-tracking,
and electrophysiological measures demonstrate a processing cost where semantic
material unexpressed in the syntax must be inserted in order to coerce a coherent
argument structure; e.g. “The man began the book” is interpreted as “The man began
[reading/writing] the book” via implicit insertion of some event information (Baggio,
Choma, van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2010; Kuperberg, Choi, Cohn, Paczynski, &
Jackendoff, 2009; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, & Lakshmanan, 2008; McElree, Pylkkänen,
Pickering, & Traxler, 2006; Pylkkänen & McElree, 2006, 2007; Traxler, McElree,
Williams, & Pickering, 2005).
In this study, we proceed one step further, and suggest that within the domain of
semantic composition, there is evidence for a distinction between two basic combinatorial
operations, even when syntax is held constant. Specifically, we investigate the case of
noun-noun compounds, in which the syntax is always a modifier noun followed by a head
noun (e.g. mountain lake, where the syntax dictates this is a lake (in the mountains), not a
mountain (in a lake)). Noun-noun compounds are a particularly tractable case of minimal
composition (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011), isolating the instance of combination rather
11

than investigating compositionality in the context of multi-word phrases or sentence
stimuli, where multiple types of combinatorial operations occur simultaneously or in
quick succession. Noun-noun compounds are particularly interesting because the first
noun – the modifier noun – can be either predicating/“attributive” (as in zebra clam,
where zebra denotes the attribute “striped”) or non-predicating/“relational” (as in
mountain lake, where “mountain” is not an attribute but an object bearing a spatial
relation with “lake”). Predicating combinations can be paraphrased as “a [noun] that is
[adjective],” such as red ball (“a ball that is red”). Non-predicating combinations cannot
be paraphrased this way: e.g. tennis ball is not “a ball that is tennis,” but rather is “a ball
for playing tennis” (Downing, 1977; Gagné & Shoben, 1997; Levi, 1978). Attributive
noun-noun compounds are predicating in that they can be paraphrased as “a [head noun]
that is [modifier noun]-like”, as in zebra clam – “a clam that is zebra-like” (“a clam that
is striped”). Relational noun-noun compounds are more complex in that they are nonpredicating, and derive their meaning from some extrinsic predicating relation (e.g. “a
ball for playing tennis”) (Levi, 1978; Murphy, 1990).
We find evidence that relational and attributive interpretations of noun compounds
differentially engage two regions of the brain otherwise broadly implicated in semantic
composition: the angular gyrus (AG) and the anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Below, we
discuss how the distinction between attributive and relational combination may shed light
on the functional differences between these two putative neural “hubs” of semantic
composition.

12

A tale of two hubs: the angular gyrus and anterior temporal lobe
Mounting evidence suggests ATL and AG are involved in semantic processing,
generally, and in semantic composition, specifically; however, only recently has there
been effort to characterize their division of labor. Both have been characterized as
"semantic hubs,” owing to functional and anatomical patterns that are consistent with
multimodal convergence (Binder & Desai, 2011; Lambon Ralph, 2014; Patterson et al.,
2007; Seghier, 2012). The ATL is uniquely situated at the end of a caudal-to-rostral
stream of information processing feeding from primary sensory and motor areas and
association cortex (Binder et al., 2009; Binder & Desai, 2011; Binney, Parker, & Lambon
Ralph, 2012; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). Moving anteriorly along the temporal lobe,
one finds a caudal-to-rostral hierarchy emerge as neuronal responses are more tuned to
complex stimuli and more invariant to low-level sensory variation; such a hierarchy has
been established along both visual (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) and auditory
(Rauschecker & Scott, 2009) streams. This “graded convergence” may provide a
mechanism both for attributive feature combination and, in the limit, for maximally
invariant amodal, abstract conceptual representations. The culmination of this graded
convergence up the temporal lobe (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009; Stringer & Rolls, 2002) is
a basal rostral region of ATL shown to have very limited extra-temporal connectivity and
high intra-temporal connectivity (Binney et al., 2012). Such neuroanatomical
sequestration is a necessary condition for a region to be able to represent abstract,
modality-invariant semantics. Thus, ATL is a prime candidate for attributive semantic
composition.
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In one of the first studies investigating the neural correlates of minimal two-word
composition, Baron and colleagues (2010) found evidence from fMRI pattern analyses
that the left ATL subserved the combination of concepts such that the superimposition of
individual patterns of the simplex concepts YOUNG and MAN (as represented by
various face stimuli) reliably predicted the activation pattern for the complex concept
YOUNG MAN. Consistent with this finding, a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study
of visually presented two-word phrases comparing nouns in minimal compositional
contexts (red boat) with nouns in non-compositional contexts (in which a non-word letter
string was concatenated with a real word, e.g. xkq boat) found increased compositionrelated activity in left ATL (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011). There is a growing body of
functional and tractographic studies to suggest that the representational unit of propertybased composition in left ATL may be multimodal sensorimotor features, particularly
visual concrete properties of object-concepts in more ventromedial regions of ATL, and
possibly more abstract auditory-visual properties in more dorsolateral regions of ATL
(Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014; Hoffman, Binney, & Lambon Ralph, 2015),
corroborating the notion of the left ATL as hub of the so-called ventral “what” pathway.
In addition to the ATL, researchers have also ascribed the label “semantic hub” to
the AG, as it lies at the junction between temporal, parietal, and occipital lobes and thus
receives a confluence of auditory, somatosensory, spatial, and visual inputs. Conceptual
combination studies of the sort described above (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012) have
demonstrated involvement of both left AG and left ATL, and several studies implicate
bilateral AG in the contrast between well-formed sentences on the one hand and word
lists, pseudowords, or scrambled sentences on the other (Bavelier et al., 1997; Bottini et
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al., 1994; Humphries, Binder, Medler, & Liebenthal, 2007; Humphries, Binder, Medler,
Liebenthal, & others, 2006). Left AG also shows greater activity for semantic violations
vs. congruent well-formed sentences (Friederici, Rüschemeyer, Hahne, & Fiebach, 2003;
Kang, Constable, Gore, & Avrutin, 1999; Kuperberg et al., 2000; Luke, Liu, Wai, Wan,
& Tan, 2002; Ni et al., 2000) and for connected discourse vs. unrelated sentences
(Fletcher et al., 1995; Homae, Yahata, & Sakai, 2003; Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, &
Braun, 2005). This broad profile of effects has led some to suggest that the AG may play
a potentially domain-general role in semantic information integration structured around
events.
Not all studies investigating conceptual combination find activation in both left ATL and
bilateral AG. Of those stimuli that elicit differential activity in AG but not in left ATL,
one finds that the type of composition may more often be based on thematic relations
rather than attributive combination. Graves et al. (2010) compared familiar meaningful
noun-noun compounds, such as lake house, with reversed phrases, such as house lake, the
meanings of which were not obvious; they found that right AG, along with other rightlateralized temporoparietal areas, showed greater activation for processing the more
obviously combinatorial phrases. Interestingly, the authors noted that most of their nounnoun stimuli were interpreted as denoting thematic relations between head and modifier
nouns (see below for further explanation); that is, most compounds consisted of nouns
participating in some spatial relation (as in “a house on a lake”) or event-based relation
rather than picking out an attribute of the modifier noun. It is likely that these stimuli
were probing semantic thematic relations in particular rather than combinatorial
semantics in general.
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Relational vs. attributive interpretation of nominal compounds
In order to further distinguish between property-based associations and relation-based
associations between concepts, consider the following nominal compound: robin hawk.
Wisniewski (1996) found that people’s interpretations of a novel compound of this sort
could be characterized in one of two ways. Some individuals applied a property of the
concept “robin,” such as a red breast, to the head noun “hawk,” to arrive at an
interpretation like “a red-breasted hawk.” Others found a thematic relation between the
two birds, noting that a hawk might hunt a robin, and interpreted “robin hawk” as “a
hawk that preys on robins.” In the first type of interpretation, “robin” indicated some
attribute or feature commensurate with the head noun “hawk,” while in the second type
of interpretation, the modifier noun “robin” was not broken down into features, but rather
participated in a thematic relation with the head noun “hawk.”
It is worth noting here that the terminology “predicating and non-predicating” is
perhaps more precise than the terms “relational” and “attributive,” which bear the
misfortune of being both very common and denoting very different qualities depending
on the theoretical framework. (For instance, there are certain non-deverbal “relational”
nouns, like sister, boss, edge, height, etc., that seem to take implicit semantic arguments
(Partee & Borschev, 2003), but we do not consider such relational nouns here.)
However, “predicating and non-predicating” are terms that perhaps imply an overly
syntactic typology for a phenomenon we argue arises from conceptual-semantic
affordances; that is, robin hawk is interpretable as “a hawk that hunts robins” only
because of the association between hawk and hunting (robin chicken would be unlikely to
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invite such a predator-prey relation). Therefore, we will refer to these nominal compound
types as “relational” and “attributive.”
Earlier literature assumed that the thematic relation was the primary means of
interpreting nominal compounds: the consensus was that only after failing to find a
plausible thematic relation binding the modifier and head nouns did people derive a
property-based interpretation (Downing, 1977; Gagné & Shoben, 1997; Shoben &
Gagné, 1997; Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991). Later proposals recognized attributive
interpretations as somewhat distinct, but still considered property-based combinations too
infrequent to be considered a different process; while Wisniewski & Love (1998)
reported that attributive interpretations accounted for 29% of their nominal compounds,
other samples reported attributives occurring as little as 1% of the time in corpora
(Downing, 1977; Gagné, 2000; Warren, 1978). Parsimony dictated that attributive
interpretations were simply another kind of relation, namely a resemblance relation
(where zebra clam is merely a clam that resembles a zebra), and a single-process model
prevailed (Costello & Keane, 2000; Gagné, 2000). One prominent formulation of singleprocess conceptual combination is the Competition Among Relations in Nominals
(CARIN) theory (Gagné & Shoben, 1997). Under this account, the modifier noun (zebra
in zebra clam, or mountain in mountain lake) is not incorporated into the head noun’s
representation, but rather a relation (e.g. noun RESEMBLE modifier, or noun LOCATED
modifier, respectively) is inserted that links the two concepts. Moreover, under CARIN,
some relations will be considered prior to others, depending on the lexical items being
combined (e.g. LOCATED is a more apt relation than ABOUT when construing the
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compound mountain lake). This model stipulates that the RESEMBLE relation (that is,
the attributive interpretation) is largely dispreferred.
However, further study found evidence for a categorical distinction between a
relation-linking process like that described under CARIN, and another process, by which
a property or attribute of the modifier is “transferred” to the head noun (attributive
combination). Several studies found that the interpretation of ambiguous nominal
compounds (such as robin hawk) could be manipulated based on priming the ambiguous
item with relational or attributive compounds. Wisniewski & Love (1998) found that
ambiguous targets were more likely to be interpreted attributively when following an
attributive-biased compound, but more likely to be interpreted as relational when
preceded by a relational prime. While this suggested that attributive and relational
processes were actually distinct, dual processes, Gagné (2000) failed to replicate this
effect using the same stimuli and procedure. Estes (2003) followed this work with
another priming study, testing whether relational interpretations occurred serially prior to
attributive interpretations, or whether these processes occurred in parallel. He found that
both comprehension and reaction times were facilitated when target combinations
matched prime combinations in attribution or relation. Moreover, Estes (2003) tested the
CARIN model’s serial relation prediction that there should be an interaction between
prime type and target type: if relation precedes attribution, then an attributive prime
should interfere with interpretation of a relational target while a relational target should
not hinder comprehension of an attributive target. That is, under the serial CARIN
account, an attributive prime would involve additional (attributive) processing not
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otherwise induced during a relational prime, and this extra processing would interfere
with comprehension of a relational target. Estes (2003) did not find such an interaction,
and interpreted these findings as inconsistent with a serial model like CARIN. However,
this null result is hardly damning to a serial, single-process account, and evidence
arbitrating between single and dual process models of relational and attributive
compound interpretation remains equivocal.
Relational and attributive semantics in the brain
The distinction between property- and relation-based semantic processes is not
unique to work on conceptual combination, but also appears in the neuropsychological
semantic memory literature. Here, one abiding question has been: Do relational and
attributive conceptual combinations arise from neuroanatomically separable components
of the semantics, or are they subsumed by the same combinatorial operation? If the
latter, are these operations hierarchically disposed in some way: that is, do attempts at
relational interpretation precede attributive interpretation, or vice-versa?
In the semantic memory literature, the distinction between so-called taxonomic
and thematic associations serve as a parallel to what we have described as attributive and
relational associations, respectively. Contrary to the conceptual combination literature,
where models like CARIN suggest relational associations may precede attributive
associations, some connectionist accounts appear to suggest that taxonomic (attributive)
semantic knowledge may be logically prior to thematic (relation) knowledge. By some
accounts, taxonomically defined concepts are the constituents of thematic relations: for
instance, the thematic relation between dog and bone is supervenient on knowledge of
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these concepts’ properties (Lewis, Poeppel, & Murphy, 2015). Also, under many
connectionist frameworks, thematic relations are reified into features, such that the
concept dog might be linked not only to nodes for “furry,” “warm-blooded,” and “loyal,”
but also nodes for explicitly relation-based facts, such as “bears live young,” “is led on a
leash,” and “chews/buries bones” (Rogers & McClelland, 2004). This approach contrasts
with a model whereby thematic relations constitute a qualitatively different level of
representation from taxonomic features or properties, where the unit of representation is
the event rather than the feature.
Consistent with an account whereby property-based associations take precedence
over relation-based associations (contrary to CARIN), a recent MEG priming study found
that activity in left ATL was only sensitive to property-based taxonomic associations,
while both taxonomic and thematic associations predicted activity in the left
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), inclusive of AG (Lewis et al., 2015). Note that this study
supports a theory of logical precedence for taxonomic associations over thematic
associations; it does not, however, provide evidence for a temporal precedence of one
type of association over the other (as CARIN does for relational/thematic operations over
attributive/taxonomic operations).
Another study, however, found evidence of a double dissociation between
taxonomic and thematic semantic errors in left ATL and left AG, respectively (Schwartz
et al., 2011). Speakers’ semantic errors can be divided into either taxonomic category
errors (that is, uttering an incorrect word, but one which has commensurate features, such
as when “apple” is named as “pear”) or thematic relation errors (that is, uttering “dog”
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when “bone” was intended, reflecting the thematic relation between “dog” and “bone”).
Schwartz et al. (2011) examined the taxonomic and thematic errors produced by 86 poststroke aphasics in a picture-naming task and conducted voxel-based lesion-symptom
mapping (VLSM) on each error type separately (with shared variance between error types
regressed out). Taxonomic errors were mapped to left ATL lesions, while thematic errors
were localized to left AG. This double dissociation between ATL and AG supports the
view that the ATL and AG support distinct semantic computations, corresponding to
property-based and relation-based operations, respectively.
The current study examines the neural dissociation between property- and
relation-based conceptual combination in order to discern (1) whether these processes are
indeed functionally distinct and (2) whether they might allow us to better characterize the
roles of AG and ATL in semantic combination. While the double dissociation of the sort
reported in Schwartz et al. (2011), would be indicative of entirely dissociable systems, it
is also possible that a common underlying semantic process derives both sorts of
combination such that the distinction is moot. Midway between these two hypotheses is
the possibility that these two types of combination are both functionally and neurally
distinct, but recruit overlapping brain networks.
We find evidence for (1) a single dissociation in bilateral AG showing more taskresponsive activity for relational compounds than attributive compounds, and (2) a timing
difference in ATL, specifically an earlier ATL response to attributive compounds than
relational compounds.. This serial temporal order is directly contrary to that put forth in
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the CARIN model, but compatible with a different serial model: one whereby
attributive/taxonomic operations are logically prior to thematic operations.
Material and methods
Participants
Eighteen subjects (eleven female) participated in this study. Subjects ranged in
age from 18 to 42 years, and all were right-handed native speakers of English with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no reported history of neurologic problems.
Subjects gave written informed consent and were provided monetary compensation
($20/hour) for their time. The human subjects review board at the University of
Pennsylvania approved all experimental procedures.
Stimuli
Stimuli Design
We drew our nominal compound stimuli from two studies investigating the
effects of attributive- and relational-biased compounds (Estes, 2003; E. J. Wisniewski &
Love, 1998). Of the stimuli used in these studies, we chose the 64 most attributive-biased
and 64 most relational biased items according to a norming study we conducted via
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Subjects (n=17) were
asked to write their interpretations of each noun compound and indicate their familiarity
with the noun compound on a 1-7 Likert scale, and three independent coders designated
these interpretations as either attributive or relational. Coder agreement was over 95%,
and where coders’ designations diverged, the primary author’s designation was used
(Boylan). Criteria for definitions of relational and attributive compounds were taken from
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Estes, 2003, and Wisniewski & Love, 1998. Relational and attributive items were
matched on unigram frequency (t(254) = 1.09, p = 0.28), compound length (t(126) =
0.85, p = 0.40), and compound familiarity (t(126) = 1.67, p = 0.10) (Brysbaert & New,
2009) .
Norming for relational-attributive bias
In order to measure the variability in the interpretations of our noun-noun
compound stimuli, and thus the degree of bias toward attributive and relational
combination, we combined responses from the Mechanical Turk stimulus norming survey
with responses taken from a survey of our fMRI subjects after they left the scanner. Both
surveys asked subjects to describe what they thought each noun compound meant, with
the added instruction to the fMRI participants that they write down the interpretations
they had entertained while viewing the stimuli inside the scanner. Responses from a total
of 35 subjects per item (17 from Mechanical Turk norming, 18 from fMRI subjects) were
coded as either attributive or relational.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of attributive and relational bias by item, orderranked from unanimously attributive interpretations to unanimously relational
interpretations. The average “relational bias” for an item categorically labeled as
relational in the Estes and Wisniewski & Love studies was 89.6% (SD = 0.14); likewise,
the average “attributive bias” for an attributive item was 94.5%, (SD = 0.10). Despite
having identified 128 items from the Mechanical Turk survey as relatively biased towards
either relational or attributive meanings, additional responses from fMRI subjects
demonstrated that some items were much more ambiguous than others. For instance,
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while the item “cow parsnip” was originally designated as relational-biased (example
interpretation: “a parsnip fed to a cow”), as was “pine mushroom” (e.g. “mushroom that
grows on pine trees”), additional responses indicated these items were equally likely to
have attributive readings, where interpretations such as “a parsnip shaped like a cow,”
and “mushroom that looks like a pine cone” were offered for “cow parsnip” and “pine
mushroom,” respectively.

Figure 1. Plot of relational-attributive combinatorial bias (normed on 35 participants,
inclusive of 18 fMRI subjects). Figure 1 shows the distribution of attributive and
relational combinatorial bias by item, order-ranked from unanimously attributive
(relational bias = 0) interpretations to unanimously relational (relational bias = 1)
interpretations. Blue indicates those items marked as relational in Estes (2003) and
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Wisniewski & Love (1998) studies and red indicates those marked as attributive in those
studies.
Experimental Task and Design
The subject’s task on each trial was to read two simultaneously centrally presented words
constituting a nominal compound and indicate by button press (1) when they had decided
on a coherent meaning for the compound and (2) whether a subsequent “probe” matched
the meaning they had in mind. The nominal compound was presented for 2 seconds, and
was immediately followed by a fixation cross, on screen for 6 or 8 seconds, during which
time the subject need only passively view the screen. This fixation period was followed
by a probe phrase, which either matched the modal interpretation for a given item (as
determined in the Mechanical Turk survey; e.g. “a prickly carpet” for “cactus carpet”) or
was a dispreferred interpretation (e.g. “a carpet on which a cactus stands” for “cactus
carpet”), where one out of eight trials had a dispreferred probe. This was followed by a 68-second fixation-cross ITI. The entire experiment consisted of 8 runs of 16 trials each.
After leaving the scanner, subjects were given a questionnaire which asked them to write
down what they had thought each nominal compound meant when they had viewed them
in the scanner.
Image acquisition
FMRI data were collected at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania on a
3T Siemens Trio System using a 32-channel multiple-array head coil. Four types of
image sequences were collected for each participant: (1) a standard low-resolution
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anatomic localizer; (2) a high-resolution, T1-weighted sequence for localization of fMRI
activity in standard stereotactic space; (3) T2*-weighted images from 9 experimental
runs; (4) a B0 field map sequence for subsequent geometric unwarping of T2*-weighted
images.
After acquiring T1-weighted anatomical images (TR=1630 ms, TE=3.11 ms, TI =
1100 ms, voxel size = 0.9 mm x 0.9 mm x 1.0 mm, flip angle 15°), we collected T2*weighted images using a gradient-echo echoplanar pulse sequence (TR=2000 ms, TE=30
ms, voxel size=2 mm x 2 mm x 2 mm, flip angle = 60°, BW = 1578 Hx/Px, 60 slices,
with a multi-band acceleration factor of 3).
Analysis
Image analysis and ROIs
FMRI data were pre-processed offline using the AFNI (Cox & Jesmanowicz,
1999) software package. The first four volumes of each functional run were removed so
as to allow the signal to reach steady-state magnetization. Functional images were slicetime corrected, and a motion correction algorithm employed in AFNI registered all
volumes to a mean functional volume. Images were then unwarped via B0 field maps
(using FSL software; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to reduce non-linear magnetic field
distortions. We applied a high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz on each run to remove low
frequency trends. Functional data were registered to the individual subject’s anatomical
MRI. Transient spikes in the signal were removed using AFNI’s 3dDespike.
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Our a priori ROIs were left and right anterior temporal lobes and left and right
angular gyri, which we delimited using AFNI’s CA_ML_18_MNIA atlas. Our anterior
temporal ROIs spanned labels “left/right temporal pole” and “left/right medial temporal
pole”, while our angular gyrus ROIs circumscribed only the atlas’s “left/right angular
gyrus” ROI (see Figure 2).
Using AFNI’s TENT function, we modeled the hemodynamic response function
(HRF) as a finite impulse response (FIR) basis set fit to each condition, with bin-width
equal to the 2-second TR, and 9 knots (TRs) modeled for a given trial. We used the full
individually fitted 9-knot FIR HRFs to assess differences in the shapes and timecourses
of the BOLD responses to attributive and relational compounds (see below); however, for
our initial voxel selection and our analysis of relational-attributive combinatorial bias, we
collapsed the FIR output: While the FIR model outputs 9 TENT functions and thus 9 beta
estimates per condition per voxel, we selected the beta estimate of the largest magnitude
(positive or negative) within a given TENT series such that our design matrix had one
beta estimate per condition per voxel.
To identify task-activated voxels for inclusion in further analysis, we first
conducted a GLM with FIR regressors for task and fixation ITI. The task TENT series
was time-locked to the onset of the nominal compound, and the ITI TENT began at the
onset of the fixation ITI (10-12 seconds after the onset of the nominal compound). To
investigate effects of relational-attributive combinatorial bias in each ROI, we used a
model with covariates for task and jittered probe event, where task TENTs were again
time-locked to the nominal compound presentation and probe TENTS synced to the onset
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of the probe question (8-10 seconds post compound onset), along with a continuous
covariate for the relational-attributive bias (see Figure 1) of the noun compound in each
trial. Head movement and global signal were included as covariates of no interest in both
models.
In addition to investigating effects of relational-attributive bias, we also utilized
subjects’ post-scanning surveys to label each item/trial as relational or attributive based
on individual subjects’ responses. We then extracted the peristimulus BOLD signal
timecourse starting at the onset of each trial, where TR0 was the onset of presentation of
the noun compound, to TR8 post-stimulus onset (total of 9 TRs). TR0 was subtracted
from each condition so that the starting point of the BOLD time series was aligned across
conditions (Staresina, Fell, Do Lam, Axmacher, & Henson, 2012). This is analogous to
the procedure of “baseline-correcting” in EEG analysis. Thus, only TRs 1–8 (2–16
seconds post stimulus onset) entered statistical timecourse analysis. We averaged FIR
parameter estimates across voxels in each ROI in the participant’s native space, and the
resulting values entered into subsequent BOLD timecourse analyses.
Results
Task-responsive voxels in anatomical ROIs
In a group-level contrast targeting bilateral AG and bilateral ATL, we found several
clusters of voxels with a reliable (p<0.01, uncorrected) activation difference between task
and ITI fixation baseline, where the task condition collapsed attributive and relational
trials together. Two distinct clusters of activity were revealed in left AG, where one
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cluster was positively activated for task relative to baseline (cluster centroid: [-45 -54 38]
Talairach coordinates) and another more posterior, inferior cluster that was more active
during baseline relative to task (cluster centroid: [-39 -67 35] Talairach coordinates). This
motivated us to treat positively and negatively activated task-responsive voxels as distinct
functional subregions within the anatomical left AG ROI. Other clusters in right AG and
left ATL were largely positively task-responsive, and so did not prompt any functional
division between above- and below-fixation task activation (see Figure 2). No significant
task-responsive clusters survived even a liberal threshold in right ATL, and so this
anatomical region was not analyzed further.

Figure 2: Task-responsive voxel activity (task vs. ITI fixation baseline) in left ATL (red),
left AG (yellow), and right AG (blue) at Talairach coordinates [-45 -57 38].
Combinatorial bias predicts activity in left and right AG
For each subject, we identified the 50 most positive task-responsive voxels in each of our
three ROIs: right AG, left AG, and left ATL. We also identified the 50 most negative
task-responsive voxels in left AG, for a total of four functional ROIs. The location and
distribution of these top 50 task-responsive voxels varied greatly across subjects for each
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ROI, precluding clear anatomical delineation of positive vs. negative task-responsive
regions within left AG for a given subject, even though group-level clusters suggest an
anatomical divide along PGa/PGp (Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013;
see Discussion). Within each of four 50-voxel ROIs in each subject, we examined the
subject-wise effect of relational-attributive bias (referred to henceforth as simply
“combinatorial bias,” see Fig. 1) on BOLD signal amplitude.
Within the 50 most task-responsive voxels in right AG, we found a significant
main effect of combinatorial bias (t(17) = 2.44, p=0.01), and this effect obtained for a
wide range of ROI sizes within right AG (see Fig. 3a). No such effect was observed in
task-responsive voxels in left ATL (t(17) = 0.84, p=0.20; see Fig. 3b) or in positive taskresponsive voxels in left AG (t(17) = 0.38, p=0.35; see Fig 3c). Activity in those 50
voxels that responded most negatively to task (relative to baseline) in left AG was
marginally predicted by combinatorial bias (t(17) = 1.23, p=0.11). A significant main
effect of combinatorial bias emerges when the size of the negatively task-responsive left
AG ROI is increased to 90 voxels (t(17) = 2.73, p=0.005), and this effect is also reliable
for ROI sizes larger than 90 voxels (p<0.01, see Fig. 3d).
In order to compare combinatorial bias effects across ROIs, we conducted an
ANOVA between ROI (right AG, left AG positive, left AG negative, and left ATL) and
the degree to which combinatorial bias predicted BOLD signal amplitude. Combinatorial
bias coefficients differed significantly across ROIs (F(3, 34) = 3.79, p=0.02). Post hoc ttests between pairs of ROIs revealed that combinatorial bias coefficients in right AG
were significantly different from coefficients in the negative task-responsive left AG ROI
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(t(34) = 2.54, p=0.02), while coefficient differences between other ROI pairs were not
significant. When disregarding the direction of task-responsiveness, there are no
significant differences in the magnitude of these effects.

Figure 3. Beta coefficients from subject-wise parametric analysis of voxel activity by
combinatorial bias (see Fig. 1) across a range of voxels within (a) right AG, (b) left ATL,
(c) left AG, positively task-responsive voxels only, and (d) left AG, negatively taskresponsive voxels only. Voxels chosen by most positive (or, in (d), negative) t statistics
for the task-vs.-baseline contrast (see Fig. 2) in each anatomical ROI. Error ribbon
indicates +/-1 SEM.
BOLD timecourse of attributive interpretation differs by ROI
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In light of the evidence that combinatorial bias predicts the magnitude of the
response in both left and right AG, we further investigated whether relational and
attributive combination effects might also show distinct temporal BOLD profiles across
ROIs. Using the same task-responisve voxel selection criteria as above, we compared the
timecourse of BOLD activity for relational and attributive combinations in the 50 most
task-responsive voxels in right AG, left AG (negatively task-responsive voxels only), and
left ATL. In this analysis, we treated relational and attributive combination categorically,
coding each trial condition based on individual subjects’ responses in a post-scan survey.
Activity for relational combination significantly differed from attributive
combination between 6 and 12 seconds post stimuls onset in both right AG and left AG
(p<0.05; see Figure 4). Interestingly, activity associated with attributive combination was
greater than relational activity in left ATL at a markedly early 4 seconds post-stimulus
onset (p<0.05).
Examining the latencies of each subject’s effect peak (using a nonparametric
Wilcoxon signed rank test), we found that the response to attributive trials peaked
significantly earlier than the relational effect in left ATL (p = 0.01). This is not due to
differences in subjects’ attributive and relational response times, as we observed no
significant difference in RT between conditions (t(17) = 0.51, p = 0.61; Mattributive = 2.65 s
(SD = 0.28); Mrelational = 2.70 s (SD = 0.26)). Time-to-peak analysis also revealed that
both conditions peak earlier in left ATL than in right AG (p<0.01). While inferring
temporal properties of neural activity from BOLD timecourses has its limitations, this
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provides intriguing evidence that left ATL may also encode a distinction between
attributive and relational combination in addition to bilateral AG.

Figure 4. Peristimulus FIR curves of attributive (red) vs. relational (blue) activation in
each ROI. FIR curves shown are from the 50 most positively task-responsive voxels for
the task-vs.-fixation contrast in each anatomical ROI, except for left AG, where only the
50 most negatively task-responsive voxels are shown. Attributive and relational
interpretations were coded based on a given subject’s interpretations taken from post-test
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surveys. Error bars indicate +/-1 SEM. Asterisks indicate significant effect of condition
at given time point (p<0.05).
Upper panel: Right AG; Middle panel: Left AG; Lower panel: Left ATL.
Discussion
This study sought to determine whether, and how, relational and attributive
interpretations of nominal compounds differentially engaged putative “semantic hubs,”
the left ATL and bilateral AG. We found evidence that both relational and attributive
processes engaged ATL and AG, but that each brain region responded very differently to
the relational-attributive dichotomy. Both right and left AG showed differential
responses to relational and attributive compounds, with relational compounds diverging
more from the baseline period than attributive compounds. However, while right AG
responded more to both compound types than to baseline, the direction of this activation
was reversed in left AG, such that left AG responded more at baseline than to compound
interpretation. This profile of activation in left AG was consistent with its role in the socalled default network. Left ATL did not show a combinatorial bias effect per se, but the
time course of individual subjects’ BOLD response curves indicated that attributive
interpretations induced an earlier peak response than relational interpretations. Thus,
while the magnitude of response in left and right AG was greater to relational
combination than attributive combination, the timing, but not the magnitude, of left ATL
response varied across the two combination types .
These combined findings support an account whereby relational and attributive
operations are not dissociable by a coarse neuroanatomical divide, but rather are encoded
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differently in different regions. The multiple, potentially redundant, instantiations of a
combinatorial relational-attributive code across the brain provide compelling evidence
that the relational-attributive distinction is a productive one. While these data suggest that
bilateral AG is more engaged in computing relational combination, comparison with the
left ATL profile does not constitute a true double dissociation between relational and
attributive processes. While we do not find evidence to support a full dual-route, parallel
process model of relational and attributive processing, we find that these combinatorial
operations may be instantiated in overlapping networks across ATL and AG. The time
course of attributive and relational BOLD response in the left ATL is also consistent with
a serial, potentially single-process model. Interestingly, the serial process implicated here
is the opposite of the CARIN model (see Introduction): while the latter predicts that
attributive “relations” are the interpretations of last resort – i.e. attributive associations
are only analyzed after other relations are considered – we instead find evidence that
attributive processing precedes relational processing. This finding is more consistent with
accounts holding that attributive feature extraction is necessarily prior to computing
functional relations between concepts.
Angular gyrus and thematic relations
AG sensitivity to thematic relations as verbs
Bilateral AG, and more prominently left AG, have been implicated in a wide
range of linguistic and non-linguistic semantic processes (see Seghier, 2012, for review),
but our study pursues an emerging hypothesis that AG specifically subserves the
semantics of thematic relations. There is increasing evidence that AG may be selectively
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activated by thematic role information carried on verbs in particular. For instance, in one
group of studies, experimenters looking at 1-, 2-, and 3-argument verbs (that is,
intransitive, transitive, and ditransitive verbs, respectively) found that activation in
bilateral angular and supramarginal gyrus (BA 39 and 40) correlated parametrically with
the number of thematic roles that can attach to a given verb, even when the verb was
presented in isolation (Meltzer-Asscher, Schuchard, den Ouden, & Thompson, 2013;
Thompson et al., 2007; Thompson, Bonakdarpour, & Fix, 2010). Boylan, Trueswell, &
Thompson-Schill (2015) also found that multi-voxel patterns in left AG tracked
information relating to the presence of a shared verb in pairs of two-word phrases,
demonstrating that AG represents information specific to verbs, perhaps event structure
or thematic relations mediated by verbs.
While left AG has been implicated in the detection of syntactic errors (Embick,
Marantz, Miyashita, O’Neil, & Sakai, 2000), it is also involved in the detection of
semantic incongruities (Friederici et al., 2003; Newman, Pancheva, Ozawa, Neville, &
Ullman, 2001; Ni et al., 2000) as well as the processing of connected discourse as
opposed to unrelated sentences (Fletcher et al., 1995; Homae et al., 2003; Xu et al.,
2005). This suggests that the sensitivity of AG to thematic roles and verb structure is not
limited to the syntactic composition alone, but also to the semantic content (Pallier et al.,
2011). It may be that left AG acts as an interface between semantic memory and
syntactic structure, mapping semantic-thematic relations onto structural constraints
surrounding verbs and their arguments. Indeed, electrophysiological and neuroimaging
studies support an overlap between (morpho-)syntactic and semantic-thematic verb
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violations. Kuperberg et al. (2008) compared three different types of verb violations: (1)
semantic–thematically violated verbs (e.g. “at breakfast the eggs would eat”) (2)
morphosyntactically violated verbs (e.g. “at breakfast the boys would eats”) and (3) realworld violations (e.g. “at breakfast the boys would plant”). They found that, unlike realworld violations, both semantic-thematic and morpho-syntactic violations elicited activity
in a frontal/inferior parietal/basal ganglia network, in accord with previous
electrophysiological findings that semantic-thematic and syntactic violations evoked
P600 event-related potentials highly similar in latency and scalp distribution (Hoeks,
Stowe, & Doedens, 2004; Kuperberg, 2007). The authors concluded that this
frontal/AG/basal ganglia activity reflected attempts to integrate structural constraints of
the verb with semantic properties of the Agent NP argument (Buccino et al., 2001; Chao
& Martin, 2000; Damasio et al., 2001; Fogassi et al., 2005).
Lateralized effects of thematic relations in AG
If thematic role knowledge, particularly on the verb, is privileged content of the
semantic space of AG, then how do we account for the AG activation profile of stimuli
like nominal compounds, which do not contain any verb? Likewise, taxonomic and
thematic errors that localize to lesions in ATL and AG comprise errors on nouns, not
verbs. We argue that the verb functions as a “spell-out” of a thematic relation, and
stimuli like relational nominal compounds require positing implicit verbs and events (as
in “a hawk that hunts robins” for robin hawk). It is also interesting to note that word pairs
in a thematic error, such as “dog” and “bone,” can be described as related via such an
implicit verb/event; in the “dog-bone” case, “chews” or “buries,” etc. That is, thematic
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knowledge is precisely knowledge of verbs and their arguments. We speculate that the
verb may be the minimal linguistic expression of the fundamental thematic and eventbased concepts that AG subserves.
It may also be that the degree to which a thematic relation is grammaticalized –
for instance, whether it is spelled out in an explicit verb – accounts for the subtly
different profiles of activity between right and left AG, and even within left AG itself.
Graves and colleagues' (2010) study of nominal compounds vs. their non-attested
reversals found BOLD activity in right AG, but not left, increased for attested nominal
compounds like lake house (as compared with house lake). The authors offer a
connectionist account of how noun-noun compounds might engage right AG but not left
AG. They suggest that left and right AG can be modeled as attractor networks, where
such a network settles into an attractor basin when it optimizes the error space in the
mapping between inputs and outputs. Whereas left AG is suggested to have relatively
narrow attractor basins, reflecting highly specific and constrained mappings between
words and meanings, right AG may contain wider, shallower basins, representing more
extensive overlap in meanings. This would accommodate “looser” meanings, effectively
“filling in” the extrinsic relation necessary for the interpretation of compounds like dog
bone that lack the explicit (morpho)syntactic information (i.e. “a bone that a dog chews
on”) that would spell out the relation between the two nouns in the phrase. This version
of Beeman and colleagues' (1994) “coarse semantic coding hypothesis” would account
for why verb-based minimal composition, where the thematic relation is grammaticalized
and explicit, would be derived in the narrow attractor basins of left AG, while the more
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fluid meanings afforded by nominal compounds are derived in the wider semantic net of
right AG.
Functional heterogeneity of left AG: semantic representation and semantic control
The effect of combinatorial bias we found in right AG accords with the Graves et
al. (2010) nominal compound effect in that region, and the distinction between relational
and attributive interpretations adds another dimension to the characterization of right AG
as a combinatorial hub. However, our nominal compound effect in negatively taskactivated voxels in left AG is rather more novel.
It has been noted that left AG is functionally heterogeneous, and recent work has
begun to map this heterogeneity to subregions within left AG and surrounding areas. In a
meta-analysis of studies comparing semantic tasks with high-vs.-low demands on
executive control, Noonan et al., 2013, found a functional divergence between dorsal AG
(bilateral, including dorsal/anterior AG and boundaries with superior marginal gyrus
(SMG) and inferior parietal sulcus (IPS)) and left mid AG (somewhat closer to PGp than
PGa), with respect to executive and representational roles in semantic processing. Dorsal
AG showed reliably greater activation in high >low semantic conditions, and was
characterized as allocating attention to semantic representations in a task-dependent and
goal-driven manner. This characterization is not in itself inconsistent with a model of AG
as a site of conceptual combination, as such compositional operations require selective
attention to certain properties of events in order to construct higher-order derived
concepts. However, dorsal AG’s role in semantic control was contrasted with mid AG,
the activity of which was modulated by the semantic representational content of stimuli
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even when matched on task demands. Crucially, mid AG was associated with the
“default mode network” (Raichle et al., 2001), showing more positive activation in the
absence of a task. Seghier et al. (2010), found that left mid AG was a region within the
default network that responded more negatively to perceptual decisions than semantic
decisions, though both stimuli elicited a negative divergence from baseline (as did both
types of nominal compound stimuli relative to baseline in our study), and other studies
found this region showed more negative activity to abstract items than to concrete items
(similar to our finding that relational compounds elicited more negative activity relative
to attributive items in left mid AG) (Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler,
2005; Noonan et al., 2013; Wang, Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010).
Noonan et al. (2013) note that centers of activation in the putatively functionally
distinct regions of dorsal AG and mid AG lie at Talairach coordinates [-41-55 45] and [39 -65 30], respectively. These align well with the two clusters of activation we observed
for the task-vs.-baseline contrast in left AG: a more dorsal cluster of positive activation at
[-45 -54 38] and a more posterior, inferior cluster of more negative activation at [-39 -67
35]. We find that the latter cluster aligns both anatomically and functionally with the left
mid AG region of the default network. Unlike the more dorsal cluster, the left mid AG
cluster showed a combinatorial bias effect, suggesting that, like the concrete > abstract
item effect reported in this region, there is also an attributive > relational effect in mid
AG (where abstract items and relational items, respectively, induce more negative
activation).
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A stimulus-specific negative BOLD response?
While we characterize the left mid AG and right AG effects as similarly indexing
a greater magnitude of activation for relational interpretations, this is based on the
absolute value of activation relative to baseline. It is entirely possible that the left mid
AG effect should rather be characterized as an “attributive > relational” effect when
considered as a local vascular and/or neural suppression. Proposed hemodynamic
mechanisms for negative BOLD responses include local “blood stealing” or “blood
sharing,” whereby blood is diverted to (local or remote) active regions and away from the
site of the negative BOLD response. This vascular effect could occur without necessarily
reflecting a change in neural activity in the negative BOLD region (Bressler, Spotswood,
& Whitney, 2007; Shmuel et al., 2002; Smith, Williams, & Singh, 2004). However, these
purely vascular explanations are not sufficient to predict the negative BOLD response
profiles found in several visual studies. For instance, Smith et al. (2004) found that a
visual stimulus exciting primary cortex in one hemisphere caused a sustained negative
BOLD response in the opposite hemisphere visual cortex. “Blood stealing” is not likely
to explain this interhemispheric effect, as the blood supplies of the two hemispheres are
largely independent of one another. Shmuel et al. (2006), while showing that negative
BOLD activity is correlated with decreased neuronal activity measured via simultaneous
electrical recordings, also demonstrated that the local decrease in neuronal activity
predicted the spatiotemporal properties of the negative BOLD pattern better than
surrounding positive BOLD activity did. This suggests that local neural suppression
drives the negative BOLD response.
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Moreover, recent studies suggest that such neural suppression may be more
stimulus-specific than most attentional accounts predict. It is well known that attention
directed to a given location corresponds with an increase in neural activity at that region
(even in the absence of visual/auditory stimulation) and a decrease in neural activity at
unattended regions. This predicts that attentional neural suppression will occur over
relatively broad swathes of (unattended) sensory space, however (Bressler et al., 2007).
Recent studies show that negative BOLD responses to stimuli are spatially (retino- and
tonotopically) constrained and highly tuned to certain properties of the stimulus (Bressler
et al., 2007; Linke, Vicente-Grabovetsky, & Cusack, 2011). Thus, it could be that neural
suppression itself carries stimulus-specific information. On the other hand, for a
reduction in signal to carry such stimulus-specific information, it may be that the firing
trace of center-surround responses in a sub-voxel population of neurons is dominated by
the surround suppression, even though the most narrowly tuned neurons are being excited
(Bressler et al., 2007; Linke et al., 2011; Müller & Kleinschmidt, 2004).
While the mechanism for stimulus-tuned negative BOLD activity requires further
study, negative BOLD responses across the brain are as potentially equally informative as
positive BOLD responses. In the current study, the mechanism by which information
relevant to relational compounds might be more “suppressed” in left AG is unclear: the
pattern of suppression may itself be part of the representation of the relation between the
two nouns, or it could be that more inhibition of unrelated information is required to
resolve the meaning of a relational compound compared with an attributive compound.
Further study is required to disentangle these options.
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Anterior temporal lobe and semantic composition
While bilateral AG appears to index the relational-attributive distinction by way
of different overall activation for the duration of the task, left ATL may derive both
relational and attributive combinations, but with a temporal offset in activation peak for
the relational combination as compared with the attributive. This presents an intriguing
alternative to a strict dual-process hypothesis for attributive and relational combination.
Rather, this temporal delay in computing relational combinations in left ATL is
consistent with a theory whereby property-based, taxonomic concepts are logically prior
to relation-based, thematic concepts. It is also consistent with a model where
“properties” are predicates, and thematic relations can be reified into features of object
concepts such that “walks on a leash” is as much a property of dog as simple adjectives
like “furry” or “loyal.” Since language is flexible in this regard, able to express the verb/event-based relational concept “bears live young” in the adjective “viviparous,” and to
convert between verbs (relations between nouns) and participles (properties of nouns),
etc., it is perhaps unsurprising that there be a means of converting relational and
attributive concepts along a single dimension. While relational and attributive
combinations may be qualitatively distinguished in AG, it might be that these differences
are collapsed in left ATL.
Indeed, an emerging view of left ATL is that its primary function is binding
distributed multimodal features (where these features might be attributive or relational)
such that an object-concept can be specified at various levels of categorization. For
instance, patients with semantic dementia (SD) tend to show greater impairment of
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specific names of objects than of more general names (Hodges, Graham, & Patterson,
1995; Rogers et al., 2004). These patients are slower to categorize objects at the basic
level than at a more general level; e.g., they find it easier to categorize a swallow as an
animal than as a bird (Hodges et al., 1995; Timothy T. Rogers et al., 2006). Conversely,
healthy controls tend to prefer the basic, ‘bird’ level of classification (Murphy &
Brownell, 1985; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Furthermore,
features that are specific to a given concept are more damaged in SD cases than general
features shared by several concepts (Papagno & Capitani, 2001; Patterson et al., 2007;
Rogers et al., 2004, 2006), a fact which may underlie the attested categorization
difficulties in SD.
This pattern has also been found in healthy subjects, in which the left ATL has
shown increased activity for categorization of specific objects (e.g. ‘sparrow’) compared
with categorization at the basic (e.g. ‘bird’) level or domain general (e.g. ‘animal’) level
(Grabowski et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2006; Tyler et al., 2004). In a study directly
comparing how conceptual combination and object-concept specificity engage left ATL,
Westerlund & Pylkkänen (2014) concluded that combination and specificity effects in
left ATL likely arise from a single feature-binding operation.
Note that relational nominal compounds are exactly like attributive nominal
compounds in that the first (modifier) noun is indicating what kind of thing the second
(head) noun is. That is, regardless of whether one interprets robin hawk attributively or
relationally, it is still a hawk object-concept of the robin type. Thus attributive and
relational modification might be of a piece when the operation is to determine the level of
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specificity robin hawk has relative to hawk. The crucial difference is that relational
combination requires the integration of some extrinsic relation, while attributive
combination rather selects which feature of the head noun is to be emphasized or
substituted with the salient attribute of the modifier noun. In the attributive case, the
modifier noun selects from among features already denoted in the set {robin, hawk} to
yield “a hawk that is robin-like”, whereas a relational compound requires retrieval of
some “feature” outside the set {robin, hawk}: namely, the “prey” or “hunt” relation (“a
hawk that hunts robins”. This integration of an extrinsic relation/feature may account for
the delay in left ATL BOLD response for relational combination relative to attributive
combination.
Limitations, future directions, and conclusions
In this study, we find evidence that both left and right AG treat relational combination
as distinct from attributive combination. Given that activity in left AG has been found to
track certain properties of verb argument structure (Boylan et al., 2015) we propose that
left AG might subserve more explicit thematic relations, particularly when expressed as
verbs. This profile of left AG contrasts with that of right AG, which has previously been
shown to track the combinatorial strength of nominal compounds (Graves et al., 2010)
which lack a verb or explicit thematic relation, but which nonetheless might
accommodate integration of implicit thematic relations. The function of left and right AG
in composing explicit and implicit thematic relations aligns with a version of the “coarse
semantic coding hypothesis” whereby left AG subserves narrower attractors such that
connectivity between (thematic) associations might constitute a tighter, denser semantic
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networks, while right AG supports more flexible (thematic) associations between
concepts in wider, shallower attractor basins. While this model of attractor dynamics is
an intriguing one, it remains to be directly tested in right and left AG. These results invite
further study to pinpoint how right and left AG differ with regard to semantic
combination.
We also found evidence that relational and attributive combination are temporally
differentiated in left ATL. Inferring temporal signatures of neural activity from BOLD
response curves has its caveats, however, given the potential nonlinearities between
neural structures and the vasculature (Henson, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 2002). Thus
the left ATL timecourse would benefit from further study using methods, such as EEG or
MEG, with higher temporal resolution than fMRI.
Also, while we find evidence that AG is involved in computing argument structure in
the context of an event, there is also evidence that ATL indexes the thematic roles of
nouns (e.g. agents and patients). Frankland & Greene (2015) were not only able to
decode agenthood vs patienthood in ATL, but found that the patterns for these conceptual
variables localized to neuroanatomically separable regions of ATL (the upper bank of the
superior temporal sulcus and the lateral superior temporal gyrus, respectively). The
degree to which relational compound interpretation deputes thematic roles to the
constituent nouns, such as agent (hawk), theme/patient (hunted robin), instrument,
location, etc., may also be read out in ATL or AG. While the division of labor between
AG and ATL in semantic composition has yet to be made clear, our data offer a
compelling reason why future study of the neural bases of combinatorial language would
benefit from a distinction between attributive and relational operations.
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III. COMPOSITIONALITY AND THE ANGULAR GYRUS: A MULTI-VOXEL
SIMILARITY ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC COMPOSITION OF NOUNS AND
VERBS
Introduction
Language owes its infinite expressive capacity to our ability to take simple
building blocks, such as words or concepts, and combine them into complex
representations. In linguistics, such “semantic composition” refers expressly to the
combination of words into complex linguistic expressions, the meanings of which are a
function of both the constituent building blocks (words) and the “rules” used to combine
them (the grammar). Whether, and how, such grammatical operations might be realized
in the brain are still highly debated questions, and the emergence of compositional
meaning from units such as morphemes, words, or concepts, is largely a mystery.
However, understanding the engine of compositionality in the brain is a fundamental
desideratum to any cognitive neuroscientific model of semantics.
Roles of left anterior temporal lobe and left angular gyrus in semantic composition
The psycholinguistically motivated neuroanatomical models of semantic
processing that have emerged in the past few years involve several brain areas which
roughly cluster into four main regions: left inferior frontal, left anterior temporal, left
posterior temporal, and left temporo-parietal (Ben Shalom & Poeppel, 2007; Binder &
Desai, 2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008;
Pallier, Devauchelle, & Dehaene, 2011; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Price, 2010).
Of these regions, there are two – left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and left angular gyrus
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(AG) – that are prime candidates to support composition, because both show greater
activation for well-formed sentences than for non-compositional lists of words (Pallier et
al., 2011, inter alia). In addition, both have been characterized as “semantic hubs”, owing
to functional and anatomical patterns that are consistent with multimodal convergence
(Binder & Desai, 2011; Lambon Ralph, 2014; Patterson et al., 2007; Seghier, 2012).
While the mechanism by which different modalities converge on a single given
conceptual representation is still unclear, it is likely that the mechanism that can encode
the binding of modality-specific features into a given concept also accomplishes the
binding of words into higher-level linguistic constructs (Westerlund & Pylkkänen, 2014).
We begin with a brief review of findings relating to composition involving ATL in order
to motivate contrasting ideas we will consider in the current study regarding composition
in AG.
The ATL is uniquely situated at the end of a caudal-to-rostral stream of
information processing feeding from primary sensory and motor areas and association
cortex (Binder et al., 2009; J. R. Binder & Desai, 2011; Binney, Parker, & Lambon
Ralph, 2012; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). It is thus located at a prime “convergence
zone” for inputs from many different modalities. Moving anteriorly along the temporal
lobe, one finds a caudal-to-rostral hierarchy emerge as neuronal responses are more tuned
to complex stimuli and more invariant to low-level sensory variation; such a hierarchy
has been established along both visual (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) and auditory
(Rauschecker & Scott, 2009) streams. This “graded convergence” may provide a
mechanism both for “feature combination” and, in the limit, for maximally invariant
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amodal, and thus abstract, conceptual representations. The culmination of this graded
convergence up the temporal lobe (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009; Stringer & Rolls, 2002) is
a basal rostral region of ATL shown to have very limited extra-temporal connectivity and
high intra-temporal connectivity (Binney et al., 2012). Such neuroanatomical
sequestration is arguably a sine qua non for a region able to represent abstract, modalityinvariant semantics. Thus, ATL is a prime candidate for semantic composition.
In one of the first studies investigating the neural correlates of minimal two-word
composition, Baron and colleagues (Baron et al., 2010) found evidence from fMRI
pattern analyses that the left ATL subserved the combination of concepts such that the
superimposition of individual patterns of the simplex concepts young and man (as
represented by various face stimuli) reliably predicted the activation pattern for the
complex concept young man. Consistent with this finding, a magnetoencephalography
(MEG) study of visually presented two-word phrases comparing nouns in minimal
compositional contexts (red boat) with nouns in non-compositional contexts (in which a
non-word letter string was concatenated with a real word, e.g. xkq boat) found increased
composition-related activity in left ATL (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011). Thus, there is a
growing body of functional and tractographic studies to suggest that the left ATL
substrate of composition may be multimodal sensorimotor features, and particularly
visual features of object-concepts (Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014), corroborating
the notion of the left ATL as hub of the so-called ventral “what” pathway.
While the left ATL has recently received much attention as a potential semantic
hub, it is not the only region to invite this label. Researchers have also ascribed the role
of a semantic hub to the AG, as it lies at the junction between temporal, parietal, and
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occipital lobes and thus receives a confluence of auditory, somatosensory, spatial, and
visual inputs. Left AG has been implicated along with left ATL in conceptual
combination studies of the sort described above (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012), and several
studies demonstrate bilateral AG sensitivity to manipulations whereby well-formed
sentences are contrasted with word lists, pseudowords, or scrambled sentences (Bavelier
et al., 1997; Bottini et al., 1994; Humphries et al., 2007, 2006). Left AG also shows
greater activity for connected discourse vs. unrelated sentences (Fletcher et al., 1995;
Homae, Yahata, & Sakai, 2003; Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005). This broad
profile of effects has led some to suggest that the AG may play a potentially domaingeneral role in semantic information integration structured around events (Binder &
Desai, 2011; Binder et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2008; but cf. Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, &
Lambon Ralph, 2013, and Discussion below for evidence that certain sites within AG are
involved in semantic control processes, not representations).
Not all studies investigating conceptual combination find activation in both left
ATL and bilateral AG. Upon closer inspection of those stimuli that elicit differential
activity in AG but not in left ATL, one finds that the type of composition involved is
invariably based on thematic relations rather than feature combination per se. For
instance, Graves et al. (2010) compared familiar meaningful noun-noun pairs, such as
lake house, with reversed phrases, such as house lake, the meanings of which were not
obvious; they found that AG, along with other temporoparietal areas (mostly rightlateralized), showed greater activation for processing the more obviously combinatorial
phrases. In characterizing the compositional operation employed in interpreting their
particular noun-noun stimuli, the authors noted that most of their noun-noun stimuli were
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interpreted as denoting thematic relations between head and modifier nouns; that is, most
compounds consisted of nouns participating in some spatial relation (as in “a house on a
lake”) or event-based relation rather than sharing some common feature (as in, for
instance, a nominal compound like cactus carpet, which is more likely to be interpreted
as “a carpet that is prickly like a cactus” than as some sort of relational compound, like
“a carpet with a cactus placed on it”) (Estes, 2003b; E. J. Wisniewski & Love, 1998).
This raises the question as to whether these stimuli were probing combinatorial semantics
in general, or semantic thematic relations in particular.
In another group of studies, experimenters looking at 1-, 2-, and 3-argument verbs
(that is, intransitive, transitive, and ditransitive verbs, respectively) found that activation
in bilateral angular and supramarginal gyrus (BA 39 and 40) correlated parametrically
with the number of thematic roles that can attach to a given verb, even when the verb was
presented in isolation (Meltzer-Asscher et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2007, 2010).
Whereas Graves et al. (2010) indicates AG involvement in processing spatial and eventbased relations, broadly construed, the work on verb adicity suggests a more selective
sensitivity to verbs’ thematic relations and/or event complexity carried on the verb.
While AG has been found to be sensitive to both linguistic event structure and non-verbal
events depicted in scenes and mini-movies (Sitnikova, Holcomb, Kiyonaga, &
Kuperberg, 2008a; Sitnikova, Holcomb, & Kuperberg, 2008b), it could be that the verb is
the minimal linguistic expression of fundamental thematic relation-based or event-based
concepts that AG subserves. This would predict that verb semantics would be particularly
privileged in AG semantic space.
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A feature vs. function dichotomy?
Given that both ATL and AG are implicated in semantic composition, we might
start with the hypothesis that any kind of semantic similarity between two concepts might
influence the similarity of neural (in our case, voxel) patterns evoked by the concepts in
these two regions. For instance, regions that encode the meaning of a two-word phrase
(such as “eats meat”) ought to elicit a similar neural response to other two-word phrases
that share either of these two words as compared to a phrase that shares none of the
words. In this study, we go one step further and explore possible restrictions on this
prediction. We suggest that whereas the left ATL may be involved in structuring
semantic knowledge around commensurate features of (object-) concepts, the AG builds
semantic knowledge based on functional/thematic relations between concepts. Of course,
this distinction could be operationalized in a number of different ways. In this study, we
test two possible dimensions along which the left ATL and AG might cleave “featurebased” and “function-based” composition: one dimension respects whether two concepts
share an event (and since verbs can denote events, we operationalize this as two phrases
that share a verb), while another dimension concerns whether two concepts share an
argument, which we will explain in greater detail below.
Angular gyrus and event-denoting verbs
It is widely agreed that verbs and nouns constitute meaningfully distinct linguistic
forms, but it is less clear whether their processing engages different brain areas. In a
meta-analysis using hierarchical clustering to identify regions associated with nouns and
verbs, Crepaldi et al. (2013) identified several clusters associated with noun or verb
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processing across all tasks, the left AG among them; however, the left AG was associated
with nouns, not verbs (though this might be due to the authors’ inclusion of activation
peaks from studies examining nouns not directly contrasted with verbs). The authors
conclude from the distribution of their clusters that the neural circuits of noun and verb
processing are highly contiguous across a wide network of frontal, parietal, and temporal
regions, and that there is little evidence suggesting that verb processing relies primarily
on embodied motor representations.
These conclusions contrast with a prominent theory stating that, while not divided
by the grammatical class of the noun or verb per se, neural areas are divided by the
semantic primitives of objects and actions (Bird, Howard, & Franklin, 2000; Vigliocco,
Vinson, Druks, Barber, & Cappa, 2011). Under this account, only prototypical nouns
(object nouns) and prototypical verbs (action verbs) dissociate neural areas: specifically,
action/verb processing recruits more of the fronto-parietal network while object/noun
processing recruits more temporal regions (Cappa, Sandrini, Rossini, Sosta, & Miniussi,
2002; Cappa & Perani, 2003; Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Shapiro, Moo, & Caramazza,
2006). However, several studies fail to support such specific roles for frontoparietal
areas and temporal regions in action/verb and object/noun processing, respectively
(Crepaldi, Berlingeri, Paulesu, & Luzzatti, 2011; Liljeström et al., 2008; Tranel, Martin,
Damasio, Grabowski, & Hichwa, 2005; Tyler, Russell, Fadili, & Moss, 2001). Also, a
study by Bedny and colleagues (2008) found that while a certain region of left AG
responded more to verbs than nouns, activity in this region did not distinguish between
high motion and low motions words, whether nouns and verbs were included together or
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queried separately. This dissociation between grammatical class and action content,
along with evidence for a dissociation between grammatical class and imageability
(Bedny & Thompson-Schill, 2006), motivates treating the distinction between most
nouns and verbs as a dimension of meaning separate from just action content, particularly
when characterizing left AG.
Instead, we propose investigating the combinatory properties of events as a means
to probe the semantics of AG. Our verb-centric hypothesis states that if AG represents
events, then phrases that refer to similar events should evoke similar patterns of neural
activity in AG. Even more specifically, phrases that share a given event-denoting verb
(such as eats) should evoke similar patterns of activity in AG; events involving eating
should have more similar neural patterns than they do to other kinds of events. Crucially,
however, phrase pairs that differ along this dimension, in that one phrase has a verb and
the other phrase does not (e.g. eats meat and tasty meat), will not evoke similar patterns
of activation in AG, even though these latter two-word phrases also share a content word
(meat).
Note that events are necessarily compositional constructs, as they represent not
only information about event participants (thematic relations), but also temporal
information vis-a-vis tense, aspect, etc. As we have mentioned, AG is more active in
conditions which involve tracking narrative and discourse structure as compared with
disconnected sentences (Fletcher et al., 1995; Homae, Yahata, & Sakai, 2003; Xu,
Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005). The connective tissue of such narrative and
discourse structure is temporal order and temporally mediated causal relations. This
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suggests that temporal information, particularly that carried on a verb, is critical to
engaging AG.
While there are “event” words that are not verbs, such as deverbal nouns and
event-denoting nouns like party or hurricane, these lexical items do not often have
temporal information. Inflected verbs necessarily carry information on tense and aspect,
while nouns generally do not (rare exceptions being nouns that arguably denote a tense,
like ex-wife, former champion, husband-to-be, president-elect). There is good reason to
expect that event-denoting verbs dissociate from event-denoting nouns in both semantic
and neural space: a study crossing grammatical class (nouns vs. verbs) with event
denotation (events vs. objects) found that while left posterior middle temporal gyrus
responded to both event nouns and verbs over objects, a region at the left temporoparietal
junction (inclusive of AG) responded more to verbs than to any nouns, including eventdenoting nouns (Bedny, Dravida, & Saxe, 2013).
Therefore, because we focus on events as spatiotemporal denotations, the natural
way to examine this is to analyze verb similarity patterns. In this study, we do not
directly test which component of event composition – thematic relations (theta roles) or
temporal event information – might drive verb sensitivity in AG, but previous evidence
implicates both.
Angular gyrus and function-argument composition
Under an alternative hypothesis, AG is sensitive to relational information
independent of the verb. The dichotomy between “feature” and “function” has a good
deal of traction in more formal theories of semantics, particularly in the distinction
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between adjuncts and arguments, respectively. The verb is the central predicate of a
sentence, and predicates, such as eat, take arguments (like meat) (Heim & Kratzer, 1998;
Pylkkänen, Brennan, & Bemis, 2011). While the case of verbs and their direct objects is
perhaps the most canonical example of what we will call “argument-type composition,”
there are other types of function-argument relations: for instance, the composition of
prepositional phrases (e.g. with meat, where the preposition with takes the argument
meat). We are particularly interested in the status of function-argument relations because,
up until now, studies on two-word minimal composition have focused almost exclusively
on another type of composition: adjunct-type composition (e.g. red boat, old man).
However, two recent magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies suggest ATL may
subserve both adjunct-type and argument-type composition. Linzen, Marantz, &
Pylkkanen (2013) found that left ATL is sensitive to verb-argument structure, specifically
the subcategorization frames of verbs. Westerlund, Kastner, Kaabi, & Pylkkänen (2015)
examined several different instances of both argument- and adjunct-type composition:
namely verb-argument (eats meat), preposition-argument (in Italy) and determinerargument (Tarzan’s vine) composition for function-argument composition and adjectivenoun (black sweater), adverb-verb (never jogged) and adverb-adjective (very soft)
composition for adjunct-type composition. The authors found that function-argument
composition (inclusive of verb phrases, prepositional phrases, and possessives) drove
increased activation in left ATL. In our study, we extend this paradigm to examine
whether AG responds specifically to argument-type composition.
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Rather than rely only on univariate measures of activation for adjunct- vs.
argument-based composition across a given brain region, we treat composition as it
applies to the multivariate patterns of particular base words (in this case, nouns and
verbs). We constructed sets of two-word phrases such that particular pairs in each set
would allow us to test our hypotheses. Consider the phrases eats meat, eats quickly, with
meat, and tasty meat. Using the logic of Baron et al. (2010), who found that additive
superimposition of the voxel patterns underlying simplex concepts like young and man
could predict the complex pattern of young man, we ask whether the complex concepts
eats meat and with meat might be acting on the base word meat in the same way, as (1)
both phrases are instances of function-argument composition and (2) meat is an argument
in both (while it is not an argument in, say, tasty meat). On the other hand, if AG
represents information carried on the verb (that is, the event, ex hypothesi), then the
neural pattern evoked by the complex concept eats meat is expected to be more similar to
that of eats quickly than to any other phrase.
Multi-voxel pattern similarity as a window to various dimensions of compositionality
Until recently, the prevailing approach in the neuroscientific study of concepts
was to employ univariate tests of fMRI data, using a brain region’s average metabolic
response to discriminate stimulus conditions based on locations of peak activation,
potentially at the expense of voxel-level signal variation distributed across a given region.
However, increasing use of multivariate methods to harness this voxel-level neural
variability has revolutionized the study of object concepts. Current multi-voxel pattern
analysis (MVPA) methods are predicated on the idea that information is instantiated in a
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spatially distributed pattern of neural activity. While some MVPA methods use various
classification techniques over voxel patterns to discriminate between stimulus conditions
(Boylan, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2014; Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014;
Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005; inter alia), other methods analyze voxel patterns
with respect to the strength of similarities between stimuli within given dimensions (e.g.
shape, color, animacy, etc.) (Clarke & Tyler, 2014; Connolly et al., 2012; Fair et al.,
2009; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Haxby, 2001; Kriegeskorte, 2008; Weber,
Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons, 2009). With the latter approach, neural
pattern variation can extend across a more continuous space than is sought in
nominal/dichotomous classification techniques. Such MVPA techniques can be
remarkably powerful tools, and have been used to query neural patterns using only a few
TRs per stimulus event, and with each stimulus event modeled as a single unique
regressor in a GLM (the beta values of which enter a correlation matrix or other
similarity analysis) (Musz & Thompson-Schill, 2014).
The current study employs MVPA pattern similarity measures to query the
relatively high-level semantic similarity space of two-word compositional phrases. We
compare fMRI multi-voxel patterns associated with pairs of two-word compositional
phrases - e.g. eats meat compared with eats quickly, tasty meat, or with meat – in which
we hold constant a single word (here, either meat or eats), but manipulate (1) whether the
word shared is a noun or a verb and (2) whether the two compositional phrases share a
composition type (both argument-type or adjunct-type composition) or differ in their
composition type. As we explain in greater detail below, our strategy is to observe the
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extent to which neural patterns evoked by two-word phrases are altered by relative
isolated manipulations in their content, allowing us a means of inferring the principles
that govern neural coding in different cortical regions. This is analogous to how a vision
scientist can observe the tuning properties of a neuron by varying a stimulus dimension
such as wavelength. Here, the dimensions we manipulate are (1) shared verb (thus shared
event) and (2) shared composition type, which allows us to examine (1) how information
carried on the verb may be critical to certain regions involved in semantic composition
but not to others, and (2) whether the putative grammatical rules that distinguish various
two-word phrases are differentially instantiated in regions of the brain implicated in basic
semantic composition. We also investigate a corollary to the first hypothesis: if verbs are
somehow privileged in certain brain regions (namely AG), then we might expect to see
that the neural similarity between voxel patterns associated with phrases sharing a given
verb might be predicted by subjects’ ratings on how similar the meanings of these verbsharing phrases are to one another. We also test whether nouns might likewise drive
pattern similarity of noun-sharing phrases in left ATL.
Material and Methods

Participants
Twenty-one subjects participated in this study. Two participants’ data were
excluded due to excessive motion, and one subject was found to have an anatomical
anomaly. Data from the remaining eighteen subjects are reported here. Subjects ranged
in age from 18 to 28 years, and all were right-handed native speakers of English with
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normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no reported history of neurologic problems.
Subjects gave written informed consent and were provided monetary compensation for
their time. The human subjects review board at the University of Pennsylvania approved
all experimental procedures.
Stimuli
Stimuli Design
Crossing type of composition (argument-type vs. adjunct-type) with
presence/absence of verb, we chose compositional word phrases that conformed to four
different types:
1) +verb_arg: a word phrase that composed via argument-type composition and
included a verb, e.g. eats meat
2) -verb_arg: a phrase that composed via argument-type composition, the head of
which was a preposition instead of a verb; e.g. with meat
3) +verb_adj: a phrase that composed via adjunct-type composition and included a
verb, e.g. eats quickly (note that adjective-noun phrases are not the only type of
adjunct-type composition)
4) -verb_adj: a phrase that composed via adjunct-type composition and did not
include a verb; e.g. tasty meat
where +verb_arg, –verb_arg, and –verb_adj always had the same noun, and +verb_arg
and +verb_adj always had the same verb. These four types of compositional phrases are
further illustrated in Table 1.
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Stimuli consisted of 36 sets of four compositional phrases and two noncompositional items. We implemented the “minimal composition paradigm,” where
composition is isolated to two-word phrases and contrasted with one-word noncompositional items consisting of an unpronounceable letter string and a real word
(Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011a; Westerlund et al., 2015). Each non-compositional item was
presented in one of two possible word orders, for a total possible four one-word items.
The format for the non-compositional one-word items ([noun/verb] + [nonpronounceable letter string]) was counter-balanced for the real word being in phraseinitial or phrase-final position.
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Table 1: Stimuli Design
Argument (argument-type)

Adjunct (adjunct-type)

composition

composition

+verb

eats meat

eats quickly

verb control

eats fghjl / fghjl eats

eats fghjl / fghjl eats

-verb

with meat

tasty meat

-verb (noun)

meat fghjl / fghjl meat

meat fghjl / fghjl meat

control
Table 1: An example set of two-word compositional and one-word non-compositional
items sharing a given noun or verb.
Our hypothesis concerns verbs that denote events, so we selected verbs that were
eventive rather than stative. Of our 36 verbs, we have one traditionally stative verb – love
– but this verb is sometimes used in the continuous aspect (I am loving, I was loving), so
it is not as strongly stative as have or own. The other 35 verbs are strongly eventive (e.g.
I am eating, I am kicking, I am buying, etc.)
A given verb in each compositional set had to be able to compose with a direct
object, as in “eats meat,” but, conversely, could not be so strongly transitive as to require
a direct object. Therefore, all verbs were chosen to be optionally transitive. This optional
transitivity allowed for compositional phrases of the +verb_adj type, as in eats quickly,
where there is no direct object. Moreover, all verbs had present tense inflection in order
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to ensure they were interpreted in the active voice. A verb in a +verb_arg phrase like
chews gum, when presented in the past tense – chewed gum – might be read as a passive
participle – as in “gum that is chewed.” In such a case, an adjectival participle would
compose via adjunct-type rather than argument-type composition.
Similar constraints were placed on the noun stimuli. A given noun had to be able
to compose in a variety of contexts (with an adjective, a preposition, and a verb) without
requiring extra plural suffixes or determiners (throw stones, throw the stone), the addition
of which might involve another type of compositional operation. Therefore, only mass
(non-count) nouns were included. Also, since one of our hypotheses concerns the status
of events as denoted by verbs, we avoided event-denoting nouns, though marginally
event-denoting nouns in our stimuli included the nouns traffic, crime, opera, praise, and
pardon.
Note that, due to the constraints of our particular two-word phrase sets (see Table
1), we could not compare two adjunct-type phrases. The nature of our similarity analysis
required that a given two-word phrase be compared only to another two-word phrase that
shared either a noun or a verb. This is because we are investigating the changes in the
voxel pattern of a given base word – e.g. eats or meat – when composed with a function
head, an argument, or an adjunct. While it is possible that the operations of argument
composition and adjunct composition each have their own stable and distinctive patterns
in the brain regardless of what words are composed, it is more likely that the instantiation
of the operation is highly dependent on the words composed, and thus highly distributed
spatially in the brain. Under this view, a voxel pattern for function-argument
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composition of eats meat cannot be expected to be the same voxel pattern instantiating
the composition of plays guitar. For this reason, we need to make all similarity
comparisons relative to an “anchor” word – either a shared noun or a shared verb in this
case. Our two types of adjunct-type compositions did not share a word: an event-denoting
adjunct-type phrase like eats quickly cannot be directly compared with the non-eventdenoting adjunct-type phrase like tasty meat, even though these two phrases are in the
same set and can each be compared with an event-denoting argument-type phrase like
eats meat. Therefore, we had no means of assessing adjunct-type similarity profiles.
However, because a number of previous studies have shown that adjective-noun
compositional phrases like tasty meat activate left ATL, we were less interested in
replicating such a result than querying other types of compositionality, specifically
argument-type pattern similarity (eats meat compared with with meat) and verb-based
pattern similarity (eats meat compared with eats quickly). This allowed us to test two
different hypotheses about the role of AG specifically: On the one hand, if AG subserves
argument-type composition in general (that is, application of arguments to any type of
function head; in this case, either a verb or a preposition), then we predict argument-type
pairs will elicit highly similar patterns of activation in AG. On the other hand, if AG is
preferentially sensitive to event-denoting verbs, then specifically verb-sharing phrases
will elicit similar patterns in AG.
Similarly, if left ATL is specialized for feature-based composition, either nounsharing or verb-sharing phrases might elicit shared activation patterns. Moreover, if left
ATL is sensitive to composition-type, we predict conserved patterns of activation for
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phrases that share either adjunct- or argument-type composition (where only argumenttype shared composition is tested here.)
Stimuli norming
All words and word phrases were matched for length except for adverbs (in
+verb_adj, e.g. “eats quickly”) compared with nouns (in +verb_arg, e.g. “eats meat”),
where adverbs were significantly longer than nouns (Madv=7.6, s.d. = 1.96; Mnoun= 6.2,
s.d = 1.97). Only adverbs and nouns were matched on frequency. We also collected
imageability ratings on a 1-7 Likert scale (1 being lowest) on one- and two-word items.
There was no significant difference between our noun-based stimuli and our verb-based
stimuli (not including eats meat stimuli that included both a verb and a noun): Mnoun_items
= 4.74, s.d. = 0.83; Mverb_items = 4.39, s.d. = 0.58.
As noted above, all verbs appeared in the present tense in this study. When
presented in a non-compositional one-word stimulus (e.g. bvref picks), some of these
present tense verbs might be ambiguous between a verb and noun interpretation.
However, in all such cases of possible ambiguity, the dominant form of the base word
was a verb (assessed using Google Books Ngram Corpus, American English; Lin et al.,
2012).
We also normed our two-word phrase pairs’ dissimilarity using a survey posted
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Instructions were as follows:
“In this survey, you will be asked to indicate how alike two
instances of a word in two different contexts are. You will do this using
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a slider bar. 0 means “exactly the same” and 7 means “substantially
changed. For example, a minimal change might be something like
“stare at the cash register” and “ask about the cash register.” A
moderate change would be the difference between “buys rice” and
“grows rice.” In “buys rice”, the rice is likely packaged in a container,
while in “grows rice” the rice is in a field on a plant.”
In this way, we were able to extract pairwise dissimilarity scores for phrases that shared a
given noun or a given verb, and also average these scores to yield a measure of how
much, on average, a given noun or verb changed depending on the word it was composed
with. That is, pairwise dissimilarity scores for the phrase pairs (meat, eats meat), (meat,
tasty meat), (meat, with meat), (eats meat, with meat), (tasty meat, with meat), and (tasty
meat, eats meat) were averaged together to yield a mean dissimilarity score for “meat”;
likewise, the pairwise dissimilarity scores for (eats, eats meat), (eats quickly, eats meat),
and (eats, eats quickly) were averaged together to yield a mean dissimilarity score for
“eats.” We could then compare the pairwise dissimilarity norms with “neural similarity”
scores (see below for discussion), where “neural similarity” was the measure of how
much a multi-voxel evoked pattern for a given noun/verb changed depending on the word
it was composed with (where less change in the patterns indicates greater similarity). We
could also analyze the mean dissimilarity norms to look for coarse similarity differences
between noun-containing phrases and verb-containing phrases.
After filtering responses for English as a first language, completeness, time to
response, fluency, and neurological disorders, between 16 and 40 subjects per each of 9
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lists (one list for each phrase pair in a given set) remained. Responses from 16 randomly
chosen subjects per list were then analyzed and used to calculate the pairwise and mean
similarity norm scores. Interestingly, phrase pairs sharing a noun were rated as
significantly (p<0.05) more similar on average (M=3.16, s.d.=0.25; where mean
similarity norm on a 0-7 Likert scale, 0 most similar) than phrase pairs sharing a verb
(M=3.44, s.d.=0.46).
Experimental Task and Design
The subject’s task on each trial was to read two simultaneously centrally
presented words constituting either a compositional or one-word item. This phrase was
presented for 3 seconds. The critical phrase was immediately followed by either a 9second fixation cross, during which the subject need only passively view the screen, or a
two-word phrase probe presented for 3 seconds and followed by a 6-second fixation-cross
ISI. This probe was presented in capital letters and terminated with a question mark so as
to distinguish it from the preceding critical phrase. If the initial critical phrase was
compositional (e.g. asks nicely), then the probe was also compositional (e.g. INQUIRES
POLITELY?); otherwise, the probe consisted of a noun/verb and a non-word letter string
in the same order as the non-compositional one-word item it followed (e.g. asks xblrdc
followed by INQUIRES PCXFDL?; or xblrdc asks followed by PCXFDL INQUIRES?).
The subject was instructed to indicate by button press (yes/no) whether the probe phrase
(or, in the case of a non-compositional trial, the probe word) was synonymous with the
preceding phrase or word. If a trial had no probe, no response was required from the
participant. 10% of trials had a probe phrase or word, and 30% of these catch trials had
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probes that were not synonymous. Probes from catch trials were excluded from analysis.
The entire experiment consisted of 9 runs of 24 trials each.
Image acquisition and pre-processing
FMRI data were collected at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania on a
3T Siemens Trio System using a 32-channel multiple-array head coil. Four types of
image sequences were collected for each participant: (1) a standard low-resolution
anatomic localizer; (2) a high-resolution, T1-weighted sequence for localization of fMRI
activity in standard stereotactic space; (3) T2*-weighted images from 9 experimental
runs; (4) a B0 field map sequence for subsequent geometric unwarping of T2*-weighted
images.
After acquiring T1-weighted anatomical images (TR=1630 ms, TE=3.11 ms, TI =
1100 ms, voxel size = 0.9 mm x 0.9 mm x 1.0 mm, flip angle 15°), we collected T2*weighted images using a gradient-echo echoplanar pulse sequence (TR=3000 ms, TE=25
ms, voxel size=2 mm x 2 mm x 2 mm, flip angle = 90°, 41 axial slices). Slices were
collected at 20° counter-clockwise to the anterior commissure to posterior commissure
(AC-PC) plane. This slice orientation was chosen so as to maximize the volume of
anterior temporal as well as temporo-parietal cortex within the acquisition, since the
former region is particularly prone to signal loss from proximity to sinuses (known as
“susceptibility artifact”, Patterson et al., 2007).
FMRI data were pre-processed offline using the AFNI (Cox & Jesmanowicz,
1999) software package. The first four volumes of each functional run were removed so
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as to allow the signal to reach steady-state magnetization. Functional images were slicetime corrected, and a motion correction algorithm employed in AFNI registered all
volumes to a mean functional volume. Images were then unwarped via B0 field maps
(using FSL software; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to reduce non-linear magnetic field
distortions. We applied a high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz on each run to remove low
frequency trends. Images were transformed to Talairach standardized space (Talairach &
Tournoux, 1988) and voxels were resampled in the process to 3.5 mm x 3.5 mm x 3.5
mm.
Analysis
ROIs and image analysis
Using AFNI (Cox, 1996), functional data were registered to the individual
subject’s anatomical MRI. Transient spikes in the signal were removed using AFNI’s
3dDespike. Our a priori ROIs were left anterior temporal pole and left angular gyrus,
which we delimited using AFNI’s CA_ML_18_MNIA atlas. Our anterior temporal ROI
spanned labels “left temporal pole” and “left medial temporal pole”, while our angular
gyrus ROI circumscribed only the atlas’s “left angular gyrus” ROI (see Fig. 5).
For those voxels within a given ROI, multiple regression was used to generate
parameter estimates (β) representing each voxel’s activity in each stimulus item condition
within subject. Voxels’ βs were calculated by convolving all variables with a gammavariate hemodynamic response function and entering them into a general linear model
(GLM) (AFNI; Cox & Jesmanowicz, 1999). Motion estimates were included as
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regressors of no interest. After implementing our voxel selection criteria (see below), the
per-voxel β values were entered into the similarity analysis.
Voxel selection and similarity analysis
In order to query the similarity space of the various composition conditions in
each of our ROIs, we first had to identify which voxels to include in subsequent
similarity analyses. For each subject, we selected those voxels which varied the most
with respect to the contrast between compositional phrases (e.g. eats meat) and one-word
items (fghjl eats), using a GLM at each voxel within bilateral ATL and bilateral AG.
Because even a liberal t-threshold on the compositionality contrast revealed no
differential activity in right ATL, we did not further analyze this region. The 100 voxels
with the highest unsigned (positive and negative; see Discussion for motivation for
including both) t-values from the compositionality localizer for each subject for each
remaining ROI made up the pattern template for the similarity analysis. Having chosen
which 100 voxels would constitute our per-subject, per-ROI vectors, we then modeled
each stimulus event as a unique regressor in a GLM, and entered the stimulus item GLM
βs for those previously chosen 100 best voxels into vectors of 100 values per condition
per ROI per subject (see Fig. 6). We then conducted a correlation analysis over these
pattern vectors using Pearson’s r. Our initial regions of interest (ROIs) included bilateral
ATL and bilateral AG. Because right AG demonstrated no significant pattern similarity
results in any voxel group, only results for left-lateralized ATL and AG are reported
below.
While we report results for the 100-voxel set below, we also used three other
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voxel sets (50, 200, and 500) to confirm that our results were not idiosyncratic to an
arbitrary feature selection criterion. These were entered into the similarity analysis as
described for the 100 best voxels, and we report results for these voxel sets in Appendix
Tables 1-6.

Figure 5. ROI boundaries of left ATL and left AG.
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Figure 6. Diagram of similarity analysis. A vector of the N (50, 100, 200, and 500) best
voxels’ β values for a given condition (e.g. +verb_arg, or eats meat) was correlated
against another vector of β values from the same voxel array for a different condition in
the same composition set (e.g. +verb_adj, or eats quickly).
Neural similarity scores for individual nouns and verbs
In order to have a neural measure to relate to the Amazon Mechanical Turk
similarity norms we had calculated for each noun and verb (see Section 2.2.2), we
calculated the correlations from the 100 voxels previously chosen for analysis between
evoked patterns of every noun-containing phrase and every verb-containing phrase. That
is, we calculated multi-voxel pattern correlations for the phrase pairs (meat, eats meat),
(meat, tasty meat), (meat, with meat), (eats meat, with meat), (tasty meat, with meat),
(tasty meat, eats meat), (eats, eats meat), (eats quickly, eats meat), and (eats, eats
quickly). We then correlated these noun- and verb-specific neural similarity scores with
the respective pairwise similarity norm scores from the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey.
We predicted that the neural similarity score, which was higher the more consistent a
given noun or verb pattern was when being composed with other words, would be
negatively correlated with the dissimilarity norm score, which was higher for nouns or
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verbs the meanings of which differed more depending on what words the nouns/verbs
were composed with.
Results
Categorical similarity analyses of shared verb and shared composition type
We evaluated the similarity of the multi-voxel patterns evoked by each item
across the set of voxels that differentially responded to compositional and noncompositional conditions in a given ROI. That is, we chose the 100 voxels per person
with the highest unsigned (positive and negative) t values from the composition-vs-noncomposition contrast in each ROI, estimated the beta value for a given item at each voxel,
calculated the correlation across the 100 voxels between pairs of items that shared a
common concept, and averaged those correlations across the 36 items. Specifically, we
contrasted two hypotheses of the role of left AG in two-word composition: (1) that the
left AG is specialized for combinations involving argument-type composition, and/or (2)
that the left AG is specialized for event/verb semantics.
We compared correlations between pairs like (a) eats meat and with meat, where
both a noun is shared and putative composition type (argument saturation) is shared with
pairs like (b) “eats meat” and “tasty meat,” where only a noun is shared, and pairs like (c)
“eats meat” and “eats quickly,” where the verb is shared. We found a main effect of
Condition ((a)shared noun and composition; (b) shared noun only; (c) shared verb only)
in left AG (F(2,48) = 6.23, p =0.004). As shown in Figure 7, the shared verb correlations
(r = 0.17) are significantly greater than correlations between noun-sharing phrases (r = 0.03; Welch’s t(25.1) = 8.03, p<0.001) or noun+composition-sharing phrases (r = 0.04;
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t(24.6) = 5.29, p<0.001). The only correlation significantly different from chance in left
AG is that between verb-sharing phrases. This pattern was robust across several other
voxel selection criteria (see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix). These findings favor the
hypothesis that the left AG is specialized for verb semantics.

Figure 7. Pairwise correlations between relevant pairs of word phrases in 100 best voxels
in left AG. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
The same set of comparisons between pairs of two-word phrases in left ATL
yields a different pattern from that seen in left AG (see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix for
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left ATL comparisons). The noun-sharing phrases and the noun+composition-sharing
phrases were significantly greater than both chance (Appendix Table 3) and the verbsharing condition (Appendix Table 4), though this was not robust across other voxel
selection criteria. Prima facie, this might suggest that left ATL is tuned to information
carried on the noun and to shared composition type, consistent with Westerlund et al.,
2015. However, the overall pattern of ranked correlations was not robust across voxel
sizes in left ATL as it was in the case of left AG: that is, the eats meat ~ with meat was
not consistently the highest correlation across voxel groups in left ATL, and there was
much greater variability in the ordering and magnitude of correlations in left ATL. More
importantly, because the current stimuli were not well suited to exploring the full
similarity profile of compositionality in left ATL, particularly because we did not have a
pair of phrases that shared both adjunct-type composition and either a noun or a verb (see
intro), we cannot tell from these data alone whether left ATL is sensitive to composition
type, shared noun, or some other dimension of conceptual similarity.
In order to compare the overall similarity structure in left AG with that in left
ATL, we performed a 3x2 ANOVA over the Fisher’s z-transformed subject means of
Pearson’s correlation values in the 100-voxel group, with factors Condition (shared noun
and composition; shared noun only; shared verb only) and ROI (left ATL; left AG). We
found a significant interaction between Condition and ROI (F(2,96) = 5.02, p=0.008).
Continuous similarity analyses between subjects’ pairwise similarity rankings and neural
similarity scores for pairs of two-word phrases
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Implicit so far in our treatment of the categorical dimensions “+/- shared verb”
and “+/- shared composition” is the assumption that the only change between pairs of
word phrases in a given set is the words constituting those phrases. However, it might be
that the meanings of our two-word phrases differ based on factors related to a
syncategorematic “context” of the word phrases. On the one hand, meanings could vary
idiosyncratically; for instance, the meaning of “meat” in eats meat vs. with meat might
not differ much between these two contexts, but “rice” in grows rice vs. on rice might
differ much more from one context to the next (where on rice calls to mind rice in an
edible state, while grows rice is more evocative of farming the plant). On the other hand,
nouns and verbs might differ systematically in their “changeability” across phrasal
contexts; that is, noun-sharing phrases might be more or less variable around a noun than
verb-sharing phrases are around a verb.
In order to check for this potential source of similarity structure in our stimuli, we
first looked at the pairwise norming scores taken from the Amazon Mechanical Turk
survey. We found that there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between noun-sharing
pairs and verb sharing pairs (M=3.16 and M=3.44, respectively, on a Likert scale of 0-7,
7 being maximal difference between a pair of word phrases), indicating that, on average,
noun-sharing phrases were rated as more similar than verb-sharing phrases. This normed
similarity measure was not predictive of neural similarity in either left ATL or left AG at
any feature level (50, 100, 200, or 500) when taking verb- and noun-based correlations
together, nor was there a main effect of noun- vs. verb-sharing on neural similarity scores
across ROIs. However, we found a significant correlation between AMT similarity norms
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of verb-containing phrases and neural similarity scores in the 100 best voxels in left AG
(r = -0.12, p < 0.05; see Tables 5 and 6 of Appendix for AG and ATL correlations across
voxel selection criteria).
Discussion
While functional neuroimaging studies have made great strides in mapping brain
areas involved in language processing, a model of the neural bases of semantic
processing is still in its nascence. This may be in part due to the fact that the cognitive
neuroscience of semantics does not always utilize linguistic theory. Indeed, it sometimes
does not need to. After all, the legacy of model-theoretic semantics has concerned itself
primarily with formalizing “the metaphysics of truth in natural language” rather than the
various constraints on language processing or the representations of concepts (Seuren,
2009). Cognitive neuroscientists are often more explicitly interested in semantics as it
deals with binding sensorimotor features of object-concepts, or how different categories
of objects are represented with regard to action-oriented events, e.g., function vs.
manipulability (Yee, Drucker, & Thompson-Schill, 2010), etc. For instance, early
attempts to define “category-specific” regions of cortex using lesion studies provided
evidence that damage to ATL was associated with deficits specific to the knowledge of
living things (Gainotti, 1996), while damage to left temporo-parietal junction affected
knowledge of man-made artifacts (e.g. wrench, hammer, etc. which, interestingly, are
often also verbs) (Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997). However, such emphasis on
accounting for sensorimotor and action-based properties of language may neglect the
more abstract significations our language is capable of expressing, and thus miss
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potential means of generalizing certain embodied aspects of cognition. In this study, we
expanded the purview of conceptual semantics from the domain of object concepts and
action semantics to more abstract dimensions – here, composition type, argument
structure, and event semantics.
We were particularly interested in two regions of the brain – the left ATL and left
AG –implicated neuroanatomically as “convergence zones,” and also as “semantic hubs”
for their involvement in processing compositional language. We found that the left AG
displayed a markedly different pattern-similarity profile from that of left ATL. The only
dimension of stimulus similarity that produced a detectable effect on neural similarity in
AG was shared verb, and by extension, shared event. Left AG appears to be invariant to
composition type, and therefore the level at which AG tracks argument structure may not
be as general as that described by “argument-type” composition as denoted above, but
rather may explicitly subserve verb argument structure, namely thematic relations. This
is an important distinction, as there are many more types of argument structure in
language than verbs and their arguments, and these data now behoove us to examine
AG’s selective involvement in composing verbs and their arguments.
Angular gyrus and thematic relations
It is still unclear exactly what information carried on the verb might be engaging
AG. Evidence that bilateral AG activity is parametrically modulated by the valency of a
verb – that is, the number of arguments a verb can take (Meltzer-Asscher et al., 2013;
Thompson et al., 2007, 2010) – suggests that the AG may read out the syntactic
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complexity of a verb constituent, rather than, or in addition to, the semantic content of the
verb itself. Left AG has also been implicated in the detection of syntactic errors (Embick
et al., 2000). However, AG is also involved in the processing of connected discourse as
opposed to unrelated sentences (Fletcher et al., 1995; Homae et al., 2003; Xu et al.,
2005), suggesting that AG participates in the construction or analysis of event semantics.
Thus it may be that AG acts as an interface between semantic memory and syntactic
structure, mapping semantic-thematic relations onto structural constraints surrounding
verbs and their arguments. Indeed, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies
support an overlap between (morpho-)syntactic and semantic-thematic verb violations.
Kuperberg et al. (2008) compared three different types of verb violations: (1) semantic–
thematically violated verbs (e.g. “at breakfast the eggs would eat”) (2)
morphosyntactically violated verbs (e.g. “at breakfast the boys would eats”) and (3) realworld violations (e.g. “at breakfast the boys would plant”). They found that, unlike realworld violations, both semantic-thematic and morpho-syntactic violations elicited activity
in a frontal/inferior parietal/basal ganglia network, in accord with previous
electrophysiological findings that semantic-thematic and syntactic violations evoked
P600 event-related potentials highly similar in latency and scalp distribution (Hoeks et
al., 2004; Kuperberg, 2007). The authors concluded that this frontal/AG/basal ganglia
activity reflected attempts to integrate structural constraints of the verb with semantic
properties of the Agent NP argument (Buccino et al., 2001; Chao & Martin, 2000;
Damasio et al., 2001; Fogassi et al., 2005).
Evidence from lesion analyses also suggests that such thematic role knowledge is
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privileged in bilateral AG. The literature on semantic knowledge has long distinguished
between so-called taxonomic semantic knowledge, or knowledge of
shared/commensurate features, and thematic semantic knowledge, or knowledge of the
relations between object-concepts (crucially from different taxonomic categories) that
play complementary roles in events. Speakers’ semantic errors tend to reflect either
taxonomic fidelity (that is, uttering an incorrect word, but one which has commensurate
features, such as when “apple” is named as “pear”) or co-occurrence fidelity (that is,
uttering “dog” when “bone” was intended, reflecting the thematic relation between “dog”
and “bone”) (Schwartz et al., 2011). Schwartz and colleagues (2011) analyzed the error
typologies of 86 individuals with post-stroke aphasia and conducted voxel-based lesionsymptom mapping (VLSM) on each error type separately (with shared variance between
error types regressed out). Taxonomic errors were mapped to left ATL lesions, while
thematic errors were localized to left AG. This double dissociation between ATL and AG
supports the view that the ATL and AG support distinct semantic computations,
corresponding roughly to feature-based and relation-based operations, respectively (but
cf. Lewis, Poeppel, & Murphy (2015) for evidence that both taxonomic and thematic
associations engage AG, while ATL subserves taxonomic associations specifically).
It is interesting to note that word pairs in a thematic error, such as “dog” and
“bone,” can be described as related by virtue of some implicit verb/event; in this case
“chews” or “buries,” etc. That is, thematic knowledge is precisely knowledge of verbs
and their arguments. Our current study provides evidence that verbs in particular, not
nouns, and not just any argument-type composition, may indeed be the representational
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substrate of semantic knowledge in AG.
Semantic representations or semantic control?
There is some debate, however, as to whether AG is a hub for mapping syntactic
and semantic representations, or if it is rather part of an extended regulatory “semantic
control” network. Indeed, the functional heterogeneity of bilateral AG apparently defies
neat description. While AG activity is most consistently and robustly elicited by tasks
involving semantic processing, both in auditory and visual modalities (see Seghier, 2012,
for review), AG is also implicated in the default network, where AG is deactivated during
goal-oriented tasks (Shehzad et al., 2009); number processing (Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, &
Cohen, 2003); attention and spatial cognition, where AG may play a role in shifting
attention toward particular stimuli having greater salience in terms of motion, value,
emotion, and meaning (Gottlieb, 2007); and verbal working memory retrieval and
episodic memory retrieval (Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). Generally, AG activation increases
with the amount of semantic information that can be retrieved from a given input,
whether exogenously generated or self-generated during mentation (Binder & Desai,
2011; Seghier, 2012).
The ostensible functional heterogeneity of AG in the literature may arise more
from ROI definitions that (unintentionally) obscure neuroanatomical divisions within
AG. In a meta-analysis of studies comparing semantic tasks with high-vs.-low demands
on executive control, Noonan et al., 2013, found a functional divergence between dorsal
AG (bilateral, including dorsal/anterior AG and boundaries with superior marginal gyrus
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(SMG) and inferior parietal sulcus (IPS)) and left mid AG (somewhat closer to PGp than
PGa), with respect to executive and representational roles in semantic processing. Dorsal
AG showed reliably greater activation in high >low semantic conditions, and was
characterized as allocating attention to semantic representations in a task-dependent and
goal-driven manner. This characterization is not in itself inconsistent with a model of AG
as a site of conceptual combination, as such compositional operations require selective
attention to certain properties of events in order to construct higher-order concepts.
However, dorsal AG’s role in semantic control was contrasted with mid AG, the activity
of which was modulated by the semantic representational content of stimuli even when
matched on task demands. While mid AG is associated with the “default mode network”
(Raichle et al., 2001), and thus shows more positive activation in the absence of a task, it
shows more negative activation for abstract as compared with concrete concepts (Binder,
Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Wang, Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva,
2010), and more positive deflection from baseline for semantic as compared with
phonological decisions matched on executive demands (Binder et al., 1999, 2009).
The left and right AG ROIs drawn in our study encompassed both dorsal and mid
AG regions, but voxel features across subjects were highly dispersed across the ROI in
standard space such that we could not determine a difference in pattern similarity profiles
between dorsal and middle aspects of AG. It is thus possible that the patterns we report
here captured a combination of executive demand and semantic-thematic representation
similarities.
However, if there were differences across our dimensions of interest in executive
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demand, or syntactic/semantic complexity broadly construed, we might expect to have
seen evidence for this in univariate contrasts. Yet we found no evidence of significant
univariate differences across our dimensions of interest: there were no significant clusters
in our ROIs for the noun-based vs verb-based phrase contrast (where eats quickly and
eats were verb-based phrases, and tasty meat, with meat, and meat were noun-based
phrases), and neither did the argument-vs-adjunct-type contrast reveal any significant
differences in either ROI. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the voxel
pattern correlations in our AG ROI also reflect semantic control processes.
Limitations, future directions, and conclusions
Our claim is primarily in regard to composition, rather than lexical effects per se,
because we are investigating the changes in the voxel pattern “template” of a given base
word – e.g. eats or meat – when composed with a function head, an argument, or an
adjunct. The voxel selection criteria we used specifically targeted compositionresponsive voxels; that is, voxels the activity of which changes maximally when adding
another word to a given base word (e.g. adding the argument meat to eats.) Given that
our dependent measure is change (or similarity) in voxel patterns, rather than univariate
changes in activity across a cluster or ROI, we chose to include voxels that responded
both maximally positively and maximally negatively to an instance of composition.
Sampling the ends of both tails allows us to capture a greater range of possible variance
in voxel patterns, a range that would be limited if we only looked at positive voxel
changes. In addition to facilitating the pattern analysis, the inclusion of compositionnegative voxels was motivated by emerging evidence that a region of left AG is part of
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the so-called “default network,” as discussed above. Seghier et al. (2010), found that the
left mid AG was a region within the default network that responded more negatively to
perceptual decisions than semantic decisions, though both stimuli elicited a negative
divergence from baseline. Mid AG has also been found to be less active for more
“difficult” semantic stimuli: e.g. more negative activation for items with longer decision
or processing times (Binder et al., 2009; Noonan et al., 2013). Since compositional items
might be understood as more semantically “rich,” or more “difficult,” the mid AG region
might be expected to index compositionality, but in the composition-negative direction.
We did not want to exclude this region when we cast our net over AG voxels, and so we
included both composition-positive and composition-negative voxels. It should be noted
that analysis of similarity patterns derived from composition-positive voxels alone yield
highly similar profiles in both left ATL and left AG, though the shared verb correlation
was slightly weaker in left AG.
As mentioned above, the voxels we selected for similarity analysis were highly
spatially distributed across subjects, and we were not able to define a particular region of
AG (dorsal vs. med) driving similarity patterns. Further study into the functional
differences (1) between dorsal and mid AG and (2) between composition-positive and
composition-negative voxels across the brain, may clarify whether voxels responding
negatively to composition reflect attention-based or representation-based information
about verb composition.
It is also important that we discern lexical effects from composition effects when
characterizing the role of left AG in verb semantics. When examining voxel pattern
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similarity across composition-positive and composition-negative voxels, we do not find a
correlation between the non-compositional one-word item eats and the compositional
phrase eats meat. However, as the voxels were selected to maximize the differences
between exactly this contrast, a lack of correlation is not only unsurprising, but expected.
Instead of choosing voxels most sensitive to the composition vs. non-composition
contrast, we collapsed the two-word compositional and one-word non-compositional
conditions together and contrasted this combined “word condition” with the ITI fixation
period. We then selected the 100 voxels and the 500 voxels within left AG with the
highest positive t statistic for combined word task over fixation baseline. This more
agnostic selection criterion allowed us to assess the eats ~ eats meat correlation and also
compare it with the eats meat ~ eats quickly correlation. Using the word-vs.-fixation
selection criterion, these correlations were neither significantly different from chance nor
from one another. This indicates that the word task>baseline contrast is not optimal for
testing the substrate of our verb-based effect, and that this effect is indeed driven by
composition-sensitive voxels
While this study provides evidence that left AG contains patterns representing
information specific to verbs, regardless of whether these verbs are composed with
adverbial adjuncts or noun arguments, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that AG
is also involved with argument-type composition in general. In addition to “eats meat”type verb phrases, the other argument-type compositional phrase included here was the
prepositional phrase (e.g. “with meat”). Prepositions have several unique properties.
High-frequency, semantically vacuous/impoverished prepositions might have a very
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different combinatorial effect than adjectives or verbs when composing with nouns
(“tasty meat,” “eats meat,” respectively). Indeed, the preposition is little more than a
function word, and lacks the semantic content carried on adjectives and verbs. Not only
do the prepositions in our stimuli set have the highest average item frequency, but
prepositions as a class may also combine with many more surface forms than either
nouns or adjectives. This “compositional diversity” may render prepositions, and
prepositional phrases, qualitatively different from the other parts of speech used here, and
this diversity may make extraction of stable patterns from the prepositional phrase items
less likely. Nevertheless, further study is needed to examine whether preposition
function heads engage AG in the same way we found verbs do. While this study
provides evidence that a shared argument (meat in eats meat and with meat) is not
sufficient to drive pattern similarity in AG, it does not query whether a shared preposition
(with in with x and with y) is possibly sufficient to drive similarity in the same way a
shared verb is (eats in eats meat and eats quickly).
The current study only investigates cases of minimal composition: that of two
words isolated from a sentence or discourse. However, it is unlikely that AG is only
tracking this level of composition. There is abundant evidence that AG may engage in
domain-general event processing in event structures as broad as discourse and in nonverbal depictions of events. Indeed, both ATL and AG are best described as “hubs” at a
domain-general level. While the current study did not directly test the manner in which
left ATL might subserve feature-based combination, a large body of literature suggests as
much. In contrast to ATL, we find increasing evidence that AG is engaged in semantic
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integration of relation-based event structure, and we must now consider whether this
distinction between ATL and AG is ultimately reducible to the well-attested difference
between the ventral “what” pathway (the combinatorial hub of which is the ATL) and the
dorsal “how/where” pathway (the integrational hub of which is the AG) (Binder & Desai,
2011). The AG is surrounded by the dorsal spatial attention networks, the posterior
temporal regions involved in motion perception, and the anterior parietal regions
involved in representing action (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011). While AG
may have originated as a dorsal “where/how” convergence zone of spatial, goal-oriented,
and action information, it may have been co-opted by language to represent increasingly
abstract relational information. These relations might be learned merely by tracking cooccurrence statistics (“dog” often co-occurs with “bone”; “eggs” often co-occur with
“breakfast), or, more likely, these thematic relations are learned part and parcel of
hierarchical structures arising in natural language syntax. Thus, the emergence of event
and argument structure in thought and language may have been an extension of the
already extant dorsal pathways underpinning action and goal understanding.
It is interesting to note, however, that while the fronto-temporal language network
may have evolved to be strongly left-lateralized, it is less clear the degree to which right
and left AG diverged with regard to processing events and representing thematic
relations. Graves et al. (2010) offer a connectionist account of how noun-noun
compounds, such as “lake house,” when compared with their less compositional reversals
(“house lake”), show differential activity in right AG but not left AG. They suggest that
left and right AG can be modeled as attractor networks, where such a network is said to
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settle into an attractor basin when it optimizes the error space in the mapping between
inputs and outputs. Whereas left AG is suggested to have relatively narrow attractor
basins, reflecting highly specific and constrained mappings between words and meanings,
right AG may contain wider, shallower basins, representing more extensive overlap in
meanings. This would accommodate “looser” meanings, and thus enable the
interpretation of compounds like “dog bone” that lack the explicit (morpho)syntactic
information (i.e. “a bone that a dog chews on”) that would otherwise aid in resolving the
relation between the two nouns in the phrase. This attractor network account of the
difference between left and right AG accords with Beeman and colleagues' (1994)
“coarse semantic coding hypothesis” of the right hemisphere. In this study, “summation
primes,” three words weakly related to a target word, were found to better prime a target
when the triplet was presented to the left visual hemifield (right hemisphere, RH) than the
right visual hemifield (left hemisphere, LH), while the converse was true for “direct
primes,” where there was one strongly associated prime flanked by two unrelated primes.
This was taken as evidence that RH contains larger semantic fields weakly activating
concepts more distantly related to an input word, whereas LH contains smaller semantic
fields that conservatively activate concepts highly related to an input word. This
distinction might account for why we found evidence of verb-specific pattern
conservation in left AG but not right AG. It may be that left AG subserves specifically
strong thematic relations, while right AG weakly activates to a wider variety of
compositional items. Further study is needed to examine whether such strong vs. weak
relations between words in compositional phrases might differentially engage right and
left AG.
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We suggest that multi-voxel pattern similarity analysis is uniquely suited to
address such questions. Our study has demonstrated the sensitivity of this technique to
compositional operations even at the level of minimal two-word phrases. We are only just
beginning to characterize the AG with respect to its involvement in semantic
composition, and this study suggests that the “feature-function” dichotomy may be a
fruitful distinction in beginning to operationalize the compositional processes occurring
in both ATL and AG.
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IV. A MATTER OF AMBIGUITY? USING EYE MOVEMENTS TO EXAMINE
COLLECTIVE VS. DISTRIBUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF PLURAL SETS
Introduction
Human language processing is remarkably fast, and there is a growing consensus
that this is because language comprehension is not only a function of receiving input, but
also of anticipating and hypothesizing structures to be checked against that input. The
facilitation afforded to the language processor when a prediction is correct, however, is
balanced against the risk that the predicted linguistic form will be incorrect and require
re-analysis. Given this trade-off, it may sometimes favor the processor to abstain from a
prediction, for instance in cases when the preceding linguistic information has high
Shannon entropy or is otherwise under-predictive. However, even in high-uncertainty
contexts, the processor may often be induced to commit to a representation/interpretation
in order to proceed with an incremental parse. As Frazier et al.'s Minimal Semantic
Commitment (MSC) formalizes it, the processor will commit to a representation in the
absence of specific evidence for that representation “when faced with alternative
decisions that are grammatically incompatible with each other or when the failure to
make a decision would violate a grammatical principle” (p. 88). These forced predictions
differ from cases when the processor is merely opportunistic, committing to an
interpretation where pragmatic factors, rather than purely grammatical inducements,
provide evidence in favor of one interpretation over the other. Whereas the grammatical
constraint on the processor prompts a “necessary decision,” the pragmatic factors produce
an “invited decision.” Both these types of “decisions” operate over representations that
are termed ambiguous, since the possible interpretations of that representation are finite
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and limited. However, when such possible interpretations are not grammatically or
pragmatically constrained – e.g. when the grammar does not require a particular
representation or feature specification– the representation is termed vague. Vague
representations do not prompt the processor to commit to a representation, and a
representation can remain underspecified at no cost to the processor.
The following two sentences together illustrate a case in which certain linguistic
material constitutes neither a “necessary” nor “invited” decision of ambiguity:
5

a. John ate.
b. John ate quickly.

The difference in meaning between (5a,b) resides in the adverb “quickly.” In sentence
(5a), the manner in which John ate is left unspecified, and yet a reader will find sentence
(5a) perfectly interpretable without knowing the manner in which John ate. On the other
hand, if the sentence lacked information specifying other propositional content,
including, for instance, the number (singular) or tense (past) of the verb, this sentence
would be grammatically uninterpretable. Thus, while some information about the verb
must be determined in order to parse the sentence, other features ostensibly need not be,
as in the case of the adverbial adjunct “quickly” (5b). Adjunct information, such as the
manner in which John ate, is therefore characterized as vague, rather than ambiguous.
While ambiguous representations require the processor to commit to one
representation, which is then abandoned and re-analyzed if later found incorrect, vague
representations incur no such processing costs. Given these predictions, Frazier et al.
(1999) used eye-tracking measures of reading times to compare processing loads of
sentences that were explicitly distributive (6a), explicitly collective (6b), and locally
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indeterminate at the predicate (6c,d). 6a and 6b indicate early on in the sentence whether
the “cake-eating” event is distributive (i.e. John is eating a piece of cake and Bill is eating
a (separate) piece of cake) or collective (John and Bill are participating in the same cakeeating event), while (6c,d) specify this information only at the end of the sentence.
Frazier et al. state that if the “decision” as to whether an event is collective or distributive
is a matter of vagueness, then (6c,d) should not incur any extra processing cost relative to
(6a,b), since the presence of “each/together” would not prompt any revision on an earlier
collective/distributive interpretation. If, on the other hand, the distinction is a matter of
ambiguity, then a decision as to whether the event was collective or distributive is
prompted earlier, even in the absence of the disambiguating “each/together” adverb. In
the latter case, the sentence-final adverb in either 6c or 6d might incur a processing cost
reflecting the revision of an earlier commitment to a collective/distributive reading.
6

a. John and Bill each ate a piece of cake.
b. John and Bill together ate a piece of cake.
c. John and Bill ate a piece of cake each.
d. John and Bill ate a piece of cake together.
Finding increased processing load associated with sentences like (6c), Frazier et

al. claimed that the distinction between the distributive and collective interpretations was
one of ambiguity and not vagueness. They note a prevailing theory of distributivity
(Heim et al., 1991) in which the distributive is the marked reading and involves
stipulating a distributive operator D (the spell-out of which is “each”). Given the
distributive representation is more complex, an early ambiguity should favor a
commitment to the collective reading rather than the more complex distributive reading:
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7

a. [John and Bill] ate a piece of cake. (default: collective)
b. [John and Bill D] ate a piece of cake. (D: distributive operator)

However, given the account that the D operator adds structural complexity to the
underlying representation, an increased reading time for the distributive form might be
expected regardless of whether the decision itself is vague or ambiguous. Interestingly,
Frazier et al. found an increased processing load for explicit as well as locally
indeterminate distributives, suggesting that the distributive operator is sufficient to
increase processing load, with or without an occasion for revision. They claim, however,
that the increased processing load found for locally indeterminate distributives could not
be accounted for by the presence of the distributive alone, and suggested that this
processing cost was due to the processor having committed to the collective reading and
then revising that commitment.
One major limitation of the Frazier et al. study was that it tested a representational
hypothesis using processing load measures. In the present study, we improved upon
Frazier et al.'s basic design by employing the visual world paradigm. With this method,
we monitored the eye movements of participants as they listened to explicit or locally
indeterminate collective and distributive sentences and considered collective and
distributive scenes on a computer screen. Rather than relying on processing times to infer
representational commitments, we tracked which representations were considered along
the time course of the sentence. Additionally, instead of finally disambiguating the
locally indeterminate sentences with an adverb, we disambiguate all sentences on a
sentence-terminal object or objects (for collective and distributive actions, respectively).
We also gathered normed ratings for every verb in our critical sentence stimuli such that
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we had measures of the verbs’ lexical-pragmatic biases for collective vs. distributive
events. This allowed us to query separately those verbs that might be lexically more
biased towards distributive readings (e.g. wearing, eating), potentially interacting with a
putatively a priori preference for collective interpretations.
Our first study targeted sentences beginning with conjoined noun phrases (NPs),
such as “John and Bill…” (see Table 2 below), since there is now a rich literature
investigating collective and distributive readings on these types of NP. In the case of a
distributive reading, the “atomization” of a conjoined NP like John and Bill into its parts
– John and Bill – is particularly intuitive. While the collective interpretation is formalized
as applying a predicate to a “sum” of individuals John and Bill (Clifton & Frazier, 2012;
Link, 1983; Moxey, Sanford, Wood, & Ginter, 2011), the distributive interpretation
applies the predicate separately to the elements John and Bill (Heim, Lasnik, & May,
1991).
Our second study sought to compare the conjoined NP sentences from
Experiment 1 with sentences using simple plural NP subjects, as in The boys ate a piece
of cake (cf. 6a-d above). There has been some periodic debate as to whether theplural, as
in The boys, can sensibly accommodate a distributive reading, or whether it is
unambiguously collective. Scha (1984; inter alia) argues that plural the can only be read
as collective, while others treat it as ambiguously collective or distributive (Bennett,
1974; Hausser, 1974). The status of the definite plural amid other NPs is interesting. For
instance, consider 4 below (examples from Roberts (1987)):
8

a. Four women brought a salad to the potluck.
b. Jane and Mary brought a salad to the potluck.
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c. Each woman brought a salad to the potluck.
d. The women brought a salad to the potluck.
While 8a and b are compatible with either a distributive or a collective interpretation, 8c
can only be distributive. The plural NP subject in 8d is strongly collective, but it is not
clear from this sentence alone that the collective is the only possible reading. In fact,
given the case in (9) below (example also from Roberts (1987)), the assumption that
theplural must be collective is defeasible:
9

Every woman brought a dish to the potluck.
The hostess asked those from Acton to bring a casserole.
The women from Boxborough brought a salad, and those from Littleton a dessert.

The italicized content in sentence (9) clearly conveys a distributive reading, even though
such a reading for sentence 8d might be less accessible. Therefore, it would seem that
The boys may be subject to the same ambiguity/vagueness between collective and
distributive as the conjoined NP John and Bill from Experiment 1.
In the experiments reported below, we recorded the eye movements of listeners
while they chose between a depicted distributive or collective scene when hearing
sentences like those in Table 2 below (John and Bill [each/together/ Ø] are carrying a
ball/box). If the decision to assign a collective or distributive reading to an event is a
matter of vagueness, then looks to the collective and distributive scenes when hearing
sentences like John and Bill are carrying a ball/box should not diverge until the
disambiguation at the end of the sentence (in our case, the object – ball or box).
However, an earlier divergence in gaze would indicate either a “necessary” or “invited”
decision, in which the processor encounters an ambiguity that it must resolve even if it
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does not have enough information to choose between the collective and distributive
meanings. We find evidence that the collective vs. distributive distinction is a matter of
ambiguity, regardless of the type of subject NP. However, while conjoined NP subjects
(John and Bill) prompt early looks to the collective, even when the verb is relatively
more biased towards a distributive reading (e.g. wearing, eating), the plural determiner
phrase subjects (The boys) produce looks to the distributive. We discuss reasons for this
difference in gaze preference below.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven undergraduate students (15 female) participated in this study for
course credit. All participants were native English speakers and undergraduates at the
University of Pennsylvania. Two subjects were omitted due to incomplete data recording.
Additionally, it was noted during the recording process that one subject was fixating on
the center of the screen during the task, and since this was a marked departure from the
instructions and potentially problematic for our dependent measure, this subject’s data
were not included in the analysis. Of the remaining 24 participants, 13 were female. This
study was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board, and
subjects received course credit for their participation.
Apparatus
The images were presented on a 17'' Samsung screen with 1680x1050 resolution,
and the sound was played on Altec Lansing FX2020 ASIO speakers. The sentence onset
was synchronized to 500ms after the appearance of the scene pair. The subjects’
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responses were recorded using VPIxx ResponcePixx tabletop button box. Right eye gaze
was recorded using an Eyelink 1000 eye tracker on a desktop mount at a sampling rate of
1kHz (re-sampled offline to 100Hz).
Procedure
The experimental session began with a calibration procedure, which usually lasted
no more than three minutes. Participants were then instructed to fixate on a small dot in
the center of the screen, which also corresponded to a point equidistant from two scenes
that would appear during the trial period. Participants were told to fixate on this point
between trials but to consider the trial scenes freely and at their own pace.
Materials and Design
In this study, we employed a visual world paradigm in which two scenarios, one
distributive (two characters engaging in two distinct actions) and one collective (the same
two characters engaging in the same activity together) were presented on a screen. While
subjects contemplated a scene pair, they listened to a sentence describing a distributive or
collective scenario. Subjects were instructed to indicate with a button press which
scenario corresponded to the sentence they heard. Sentences were ultimately
disambiguated by the object that underwent the action, though sentence items with an
adverb (“each” or “together”) were effectively disambiguated earlier.
Target items consisted of 24 sets of six prerecorded sentences. The words and
phrases in the sentences were recorded and coded for onset and offset times using
PRAAT and FAVE (Boersma & Weenink, 2015; Rosenfleder, Fruehwald, Evanini, &
Yuan, 2011). The six items in each of the 24 sets were derived from a base sentence that
included a plural subject (e.g. “John and Bill”), a predicate that was ambiguous between a
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collective and distributive reading (e.g. “are carrying”), and a direct object that could bias
the sentence towards a collective or distributive reading. To extend the ambiguity period
for the ambiguous sentences, all objects were modified by a neutral (non-disambiguating)
adjective. The six sentences in each of 24 critical item sets were as follows:
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Table 2
Conjoined NP

Disambiguator

Ambiguous region

Ambiguous

1 (verb)

region 2

Object

(adjective)
1. John and

Ø

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

each (distributive)

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

3. John and

together

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

Bill

(collective)

4. John and

Ø

are carrying

a bright red

box.

each (distributive)

are carrying

a bright red

box.

6. John and

together

are carrying

a bright red

box.

Bill

(collective)

Bill
2. John and
Bill

Bill
5. John and
Bill

Table 2: Experiment 1: Conjoined NP sentences. Subjects listened to one of these 6
sentence types while viewing a scene diptych like that shown in Figure 8. Sentences
began with conjoined NP subjects and were either not disambiguated until the object
word (1,4) or were disambiguated early by distributive “each” (2, 5) or collective
“together” (3,6).
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Figure 8

Figure 8: Two typical scene pairs, A and B, only one of which would appear for a given
item in a given list.See (1)-(6) in Table 2 for list of sentences matched to each scene pair.
Scenes were clipart images edited in Gimp and Paintbrush software.
To avoid repetition and priming effects, we presented each given subject with
only one of the six variants of each sentence set. In addition to the 24 test items, there
were 24 fillers. These fillers were sentences of the same basic form as the test items, and
each filler was presented along with two scenes (one target scene and one distracter
scene). Eight of the fillers were disambiguated at the subject, eight at the predicate and
eight at the object. Thus the targets and fillers were distributed across six lists in a Latin
Square design, with targets counterbalanced on disambiguating term, object bias, and the
side of the screen the target scenario appeared on. Items were pseudorandomized and
item order was matched across lists.

100

Note that though the object (ball/box) was not uttered until the end of the
sentence, the relative “collective bias” of a scenario was represented in the visual world
independent of the sentence. If subjects find collective or distributive scenes more salient
or attractive in some way, regardless of the ambiguity/vagueness of an accompanying
sentence, then we should see preference for one or another type of event as depicted in
the visual world alone. We conducted an online survey asking subjects (n=12) to indicate
which of the two scenes was more “plausible.” The two scenes were paired as they were
in the eye-tracking study: one collective, one distributive, and both depicting the same
base event (carrying, eating, etc.) There were no significant differences in plausibility
preference for collective vs. distributive scenes. We were thus able to proceed under the
assumption that the collective and distributive scenes themselves did not bias looks
independent of the sentence uttered.
Our hypothesis states that a late, adverb-prompted divergence in looks between
collective and distributive scenes would indicate the decision was a matter of vagueness,
while an earlier divergence in gaze (say, at the verb) would suggest a case of ambiguity.
However, we have no explicit cut-off for what is “early” enough to be a forced
grammatical decision or “late” enough to be a more opportunistic invited decision. In the
case of pre-adverb gaze divergence, examination of other factors around the verb allows
us to see how robust an early preference for a collective or distributive scene might be.
Therefore, we conducted another survey to assess the verb’s “collective/distributive
affordance;” that is, a normed measure of the likelihood a verb denotes a collective or
distributive event.
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To collect such a measure, we used a methodology introduced by Berent, Pinker,
Tzelgov, Bibi, & Goldfarb (2005) and extended by Patson & Warren (2010) to examine
how singular indefinite noun phrases in distributed predicates (as in a ball/box) can be
interpreted as conceptually plural. When shown sentences like those in 2 and 3 in Table 2
above, subjects in the Patson & Warren study indicated how many balls were involved in
the event: one or many. Instead of using a real-world object as the indefinite NP in our
study, we replaced a ball with a nonce word, such as a wug (Albright, 2009; Berko,
1958). This allowed us to query subjects’ intuitions about the verb independent of the
affordances of real-world objects like balls, boxes, pieces of cake, etc. Assessing verblevel biases gives us a more local measure of participants’ preferences at the verb, before
the disambiguating object is uttered. We conducted a survey on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2011) asking subjects (n=114) to indicate their confidence on a
1-4 Likert scale that there was/were “definitely one wug” (1), “probably one wug” (2),
“probably more than one wug” (3), and “definitely more than one wug” (4). We later
used these ratings to identify the twelve most distributive-biased verbs (second quartile of
24 verbs; M=3.11, s.d. 0.34) and examine how their time course compared with that of all
24 verbs.
Analysis
Areas of interest were drawn around the distributive and collective scenes, and
using these boundaries, fixations were coded as “collective,” “distributive,” or “other.”
Eye-tracking data were first scrutinized for accuracy and track loss: any missing data
points and trials which led to incorrect responses were removed from the data before
further analysis. A sample was coded as ‘‘track loss” if the participant’s eyes were
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closed or otherwise occluded, and a trial was dropped from analysis if track loss
accounted for more than 25% of the frames (this made up less than 5% of the data).
Timecourses of fixations to collective and distributive scenes were plotted for Ø-,
each-, and together-disambiguated sentences for each subject. The dependent measure is
termed the “collective advantage,” as it is the number of fixations on distributive scenes
subtracted from the number of fixations for each sample in each disambiguation
condition. Plotted in Figure 9 below are the timecourses time-locked to the onset of the
verb (e.g. carrying), with a delay of 150 ms to account for saccade planning and
execution. We also aggregated collective advantage measures across time windows
defined by the onsets and offsets (delayed by 150ms) of the following phrases: John and
Bill | each/together/Ø | are carrying | a bright red | ball/box. This time window analysis
allowed us to time-lock to multiple time points in the sentence, rather than just to the
predicate onset, in order to analyze gaze preferences at each phrase. Statistical analysis
was conducted over an empirical logit (e-logit) transform of the collective advantage
measure for each subject. The e-logit is a quasi-logit transformation optimized for
handling cases for which the standard logit is too large or small (when the probabilities
approach 0 or 1) (Barr, 2008).
Results
Predicate-locked time-courses
By the time the predicate is uttered, the subject has received disambiguating
information for the together and each conditions, and so has enough information to
resolve on a scene even while the predicate is heard. However, subjects hearing the nondisambiguated sentences have no prior disambiguating information. Figure 9 shows plots
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of the collective advantage time-locked to the onset of the predicate. Since the predicate
is hypothesized to carry the distributive operator, it is reasonable to treat the predicate as
the effective disambiguator for the Ø condition. These plots provide a visual confirmation
that once the disambiguating term (each/together) is uttered (~500ms prior to predicate
onset), looks to the collective and distributive scenes diverge rapidly. Ø sentences appear
to pattern initially with the together, prompting increased looks to the collective scene.
Interestingly, though the each sentences initially prompt looks to the distributive scene,
there is an increase in looks to the collective during the adjectival phrase (~100ms postpredicate). This reconsideration of the other scene is not found in the together trajectory,
in which looks to the collective scene persist or increase monotonically throughout the
evolution of the utterance post-adverb. The non-disambiguated sentences (purple and
yellow in Fig 9) prompt an initial increase in looks to the collective during the utterance
of the verb, returning to chance at the adjective phrase.
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Figure 9

Figure 9: Plots of collective advantage to collective (positive) and distributive (negative)
scenes over time for conjoined NP subjects, time-locked to the onset of the verb.
Timecourses of each-disambiguated sentences are in red and timecourses of togetherdisambiguated sentences are in blue. Note that the Ø condition is split into those
sentences eventually disambiguated by the object ball/box to a collective (purple) or
distributive (yellow) scene.
Time window analyses
We also ran a by-subject 3x3 ANOVA on e-logit collective advantage measures,
with factors Disambiguator (each/together/Ø) and Time window (“John and Bill”/“are
carrying”/“a bright red”). Since the disambiguator (each/together) time window was
105

non-existent in the Ø disambiguator condition, this time window was not included in the
ANOVA, though we do include it among the planned pairwise t-tests of disambiguator
effects in each time window (see Figure 10). There was a main effect of both
Disambiguator (F(2,46) = 18.33, p<0.001) and Time window (F(2,46) = 4.59, p=0.02),
as well as a significant interaction between Disambiguator and Time window (F(4,92) =
10.2, p< 0.001).
Figure 10

Figure 10: Plots of collective advantage for conjoined NP sentences in four time
windows. Average fixations across subjects for each-disambiguated sentences are plotted
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in red, together-disambiguated sentences in blue, and non-disambiguated (until object)
sentences in green. The final convergence on ball or box is not shown here, and the nondisambiguated sentences that eventually converge on ball or box are collapsed here
(purple and yellow timecourses from Figure 9 are collapsed and indicated in green here.)
We also ran pairwise two-sided t-tests on each vs. together, each vs. Ø, and
together vs. Ø, using the Holm (1979) method of correction for multiple comparisons.
Within the conjoined NP (John and Bill) window, we found no pairwise differences in
collective advantage between each, together, and Ø, and none of the disambiguator
conditions differed significantly from chance (µ=0). In the each vs. together time
window, we still found no significant divergence in looks, and neither condition was
different from chance. In the verb (are carrying) time window, however, we see that the
each condition is significantly more likely to prompt looks to the distributive than the Ø
condition (p<0.001), together condition (p<0.001), and chance (p<0.001). The together
and Ø conditions are not significantly different, and the together condition directs looks
to the collective scene above chance (p=0.03) while the Ø condition is marginally above
chance (p=0.06). Finally, in the adjective time window (a bright red), immediately
preceding the object (ball/box), we find all three disambiguator conditions diverging from
one another: the each condition is significantly more likely to direct looks to the
distributive scene than chance, Ø, and together conditions (all p<0.001), while together is
also prompting looks to the collective scene above both chance and Ø (p<0.001). The Ø
condition is equally likely to direct looks to the collective and distributive scenes in this
time window.
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Distributive-biased verbs
The timecourse and time window data indicate that the together and Ø conditions
pattern together early on, both favoring the collective scenario at the verb. While this
collective preference is trivial for the together conditions, as the sentence has already
explicitly indexed the collective meaning via together, it is interesting that the Ø
condition timecourse initially evolves as if there were an implicit “together.” Does this
collective preference also hold for the Ø condition of the subset of verbs in our stimuli for
which we have evidence of a lexical/pragmatic distributive bias?

108

Figure 11

Figure 11: Timecourse of sentences with distributive-biased verbs. Note that carrying is
not a distributive-biased verb, but is included here for ready comparison with previous
figures.
Looking only at the twelve most distributive-biased verbs according to our
Mechanical Turk survey scale (Figure 11), we find that even if a verb has a
subcategorization preference for distributive events or plural objects, there is still a
preference for the collective meaning at the predicate (p<0.1 against chance).
Summary of Experiment 1
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This profile of disambiguator effects across time windows demonstrates that the
together and Ø conditions pattern together and diverge from the each condition as early
as the onset of the verb. Thus, even though the ambiguous Ø sentences do not have
information discerning between a possible collective or distributive interpretation, they
nevertheless prompt looks to the collective, the time course for which is reliably different
from the time course of distributive-directed each sentences. This provides evidence that
the subject has committed to the collective interpretation in the absence of
disambiguating information.
In this analysis of the dynamics of looks to collective and distributive scenes, we
find evidence that the processor does not passively await information before committing
to a collective representation. Rather, the processor appears to default to an underlying
collective reading even in the absence of disambiguating information. Moreover, in the
absence of an adverbial distributivity operator, the processor still pre-emptively commits
to a collective meaning even when we consider those verbs more likely to denote a
distributive event (Figure 11).
We now ask whether sentences with conjoined NP subjects like John and Bill
differ from sentences with another type of subject NP. If the collective reading is indeed
the default interpretation, we should also find evidence for preferential gaze to the
collective when sentences begin with a plural determiner phrase such as The boys.
Experiment 2
Method
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Participants
Twenty-seven undergraduate students (18 female) participated in this study for
course credit. None of these subjects had participated in Experiment 1. All participants
were native English speakers and undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania. This
study was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board, and
subjects received course credit for their participation.
Apparatus
The images were presented on a 17'' Samsung screen with 1680x1050 resolution,
and the sound was played on Altec Lansing FX2020 ASIO speakers. The sentence onset
was synchronized to 500ms after the appearance of the scene pair. The subjects’
responses were recorded using VPIxx ResponcePixx tabletop button box. Right eye gaze
was recorded using an Eyelink 1000 eye tracker on a desktop mount at a sampling rate of
1kHz (re-sampled offline to 100Hz).
Procedure
The experimental session began with a calibration procedure, which usually lasted
no more than three minutes. Participants were then instructed to fixate on a small dot in
the center of the screen, which also corresponded to a point equidistant from two scenes
that would appear during the trial period. Participants were told to fixate on this point
between trials but to consider the trial scenes freely and at their own pace.
Materials and Design
This study employed the same visual world paradigm as in the first study. The
exact same scene diptychs were presented to subjects: one distributive scene and one
collective scene. This study differed from Experiment 1 only insofar as the sentences
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played during presentation of the scenes included a plural determiner phrase, such as The
boys, the girls, or the friends instead of conjoined NPs like John and Bill.
Target items consisted of 24 sets of six prerecorded sentences. The six sentences
in each of 24 critical item sets were as follows:
Table 3
Conjoined NP

Disambiguator

Ambiguous region

Ambiguous

1 (verb)

region 2

Object

(adjective)
1. The boys

Ø

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

2. The boys

each (distributive)

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

3. The boys

together

are carrying

a bright red

ball.

(collective)
4. The boys

Ø

are carrying

a bright red

box.

5. The boys

each (distributive)

are carrying

a bright red

box.

6. The boys

together

are carrying

a bright red

box.

(collective)

Table 3: Experiment 2: Plural NP sentences. Subjects listened to one of these 6 sentence
types while viewing a scene diptych like that shown in Figure 8. Sentences began with
plural NP subjects and were either not disambiguated until the object word (1,4) or were
disambiguated early by distributive “each” (2, 5) or collective “together” (3,6).
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Analysis
Areas of interest were drawn around the distributive and collective scenes, and
using these boundaries, fixations were coded as “collective,” “distributive,” or “other.”
Eye-tracking data were first scrutinized for accuracy and track loss: any missing data
points and trials which led to incorrect responses were removed from the data before
further analysis. A sample was coded as ‘‘track loss” if the participant’s eyes were
closed or otherwise occluded, and a trial was dropped from analysis if track loss
accounted for more than 25% of the frames (this made up less than 5% of the data).
Timecourses of fixations to collective and distributive scenes were plotted for Ø-,
each-, and together-disambiguated sentences for each subject. The dependent measure is
termed the “collective advantage,” as it is the number of fixations on distributive scenes
subtracted from the number of fixations for each sample in each disambiguation
condition. Plotted in Figure 12 below are the timecourses time-locked to the onset of the
verb (e.g. carrying), with a delay of 150 ms to account for saccade planning and
execution. We also aggregated collective advantage measures across time windows
defined by the onsets and offsets (delayed by 150ms) of the following phrases: The boys |
each/together/Ø | are carrying | a bright red | ball/box
Results
Predicate-locked time-courses
Timecourses of conditional looks to collective and distributive scenes prompted
by plural determiner (e.g. The boys) sentences show a marked departure from the pattern
we observed in Experiment 1. Figure 12 shows plots of the collective advantage timelocked to the onset of the predicate. As expected, we see that each and together sentences
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diverge rapidly, with Ø sentences appearing to pattern initially more with the each
condition in prompting increased looks to the distributive scene.
Figure 12

Figure 12: Plots of collective advantage to collective (positive) and distributive (negative)
scenes over time for plural NP subjects, time-locked to the onset of the verb. Timecourses
of each-disambiguated sentences are in red and timecourses of together-disambiguated
sentences are in blue. Note that the Ø condition is split into those sentences eventually
disambiguated by the object ball/box to a collective (purple) or distributive (yellow)
scene.
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Time window analyses
We ran a by-subject 3x3 ANOVA on e-logit collective advantage measures, with
factors Disambiguator (each/together/Ø) and Time window (“The boys”/“are
carrying”/“a bright red”). Since the disambiguator (each/together) time window was
non-existent in the Ø disambiguator condition, this time window was not included in the
ANOVA, though we do include it among the planned pairwise t-tests of disambiguator
effects in each time window (see Figure 13). We found a main effect of Disambiguator
(F(2,52) = 16.07, p<0.001) and a significant interaction between Disambiguator and Time
window (F(4,104) = 12.14, p< 0.001).
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Figure 13

Figure 13: Plots of collective advantage for plural determiner NP sentences in four time
windows. Average fixations across subjects for each-disambiguated sentences are plotted
in red, together-disambiguated sentences in blue, and non-disambiguated (until object)
sentences in green. The final convergence on ball or box is not shown here, and the nondisambiguated sentences that eventually converge on ball or box are collapsed here
(purple and yellow timecourses from Figure 12 are collapsed and indicated in green
here.)
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We also ran pairwise two-sided t-tests on each vs. together, each vs. Ø, and
together vs. Ø, using the Holm (1979) method of correction for multiple comparisons. As
with the conjoined NP (John and Bill) window, we found no pairwise differences in
collective advantage between each, together, and Ø in the The boys time window, and
none of the disambiguator conditions differed significantly from chance (µ=0). In the
each vs. together time window, we still found no significant divergence in looks, though
the together condition was, interestingly, significantly more likely to direct looks to the
distributive scene compared with chance. In the verb (are carrying) time window, we
found that the together condition is marked, it being significantly more likely to prompt
looks to the collective than the Ø condition (p<0.001), each condition (p<0.001), and
chance (p<0.001). The each and Ø conditions are not significantly different, and the Ø
condition directs looks to the distributive scene above chance (p=0.006) while the each
condition does not differ significantly from chance (p>0.1). Finally, in the adjective time
window (a bright red), immediately preceding the object (ball/box), we find all three
disambiguator conditions diverging from one another: the each condition is significantly
more likely to direct looks to the distributive scene than chance (p<0.001), Ø (p=0.001),
and together conditions (p<0.001), while together is also prompting looks to the
collective scene above both chance (p=0.004) and Ø (p=0.03). The Ø condition is equally
likely to direct looks to the collective and distributive scenes in this time window.
Distributive-biased verbs
The timecourse and time window data for plural NP sentences indicate that the
each and Ø conditions pattern together early on, both favoring the distributive scenario at
the verb. While this distributive preference is expected for the each condition, it is rather
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surprising, especially given the Ø condition’s collective preference in Experiment 1, that
the Ø condition directs looks to the distributive scene. We examined whether the subset
of verbs showing a relative collective bias (twelve verbs with highest collective score on
the Mechanical Turk survey) also favored the distributive scenes at the predicate time
window. We found that collective-biased verbs were at chance for collective advantage.
Thus, the more distributive-biased verbs in our stimuli appear to drive the overall
distributive gaze preference at the verb in sentences beginning with plural NPs like The
boys.
Summary of Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, we find evidence that verbs taking plural NP subject
arguments demonstrate preference for a particular reading even in the absence of
information determining a collective or distributive meaning. However, unlike previous
studies and Experiment 1, we find that plural determiner NPs direct looks to the
distributive reading, not the collective. Targeting the verb time window (are carrying),
we indeed find an interaction between the type of subject NP (conjoined NP like John
and Bill vs. plural determiner phrase like The boys) and disambiguator type
(each/together/ Ø) (F(2,98) = 8.68, p<0.001), reflecting the fact that Ø and together
pattern together in conjoined NP sentences while Ø and each pattern together in plural
determiner NP sentences.
This may appear to be inconsistent with theories stating that because an extra
operator must be posited to “distribute” a predicate over individuals in a group, the
introduction of such a distributive operator is dispreferred in the absence of an explicit
(adverbial) quantifier (Clifton & Frazier, 2012; Roberts, 1987; inter alia). Below, we
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discuss several possible reasons why sentences beginning with The boys might differ
from sentences beginning with John and Bill.
Discussion
A matter of ambiguity
In both Experiments 1 and 2, we find fixation patterns consistent with what
Frazier et al. (1999) call “necessary decision”: when the processor reaches the verb, it
forces a commitment to one interpretation (the collective or the distributive). In
Experiment 1, we found that even the time course of sentences with pragmatically
distributive-biased predicates favor the collective reading until the object re-directs
attention to the distributive scene (Figure 11), which suggests this is a grammatical forced
choice rather than a pragmatic “invited decision.” In the case of an “invited decision,” a
lexical or pragmatic bias might induce an immediate preference for one meaning or
another based on a particularly strong collective or distributive “cloze” (where we intend
this to mean a preference for a collective/distributive event rather than any one particular
lexical item). However, since even distributive-biased predicates prompt looks initially
to the collective scene, it is unlikely that the ambiguity is a lexical/pragmatic “invited
decision.” Similarly, if there were a preference for the images depicting collective scenes
over those depicting distributive scenes, we would have seen this in our image survey.
Therefore, the immediacy of the preference for the collective scene in Experiment 1 is
highly suggestive of a grammatical forced choice, or a “necessary decision” in the
parlance of Frazier et al. (1999).
Both experiments support a theory that treats the collective/distributive distinction
as ambiguous rather than vague. However, a limitation of these studies and others is the
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treatment of the “vagueness” hypothesis as the null hypothesis. Whereas Frazier et al. do
not suggest any positive test for vagueness (only negative results would “confirm”
vagueness), our study is able to test one prediction of the vagueness hypothesis: if the
collective/distributive distinction were a matter of vagueness only, we would expect
increased looks to be a function of new information only. That is, we would expect
increased looks to the collective scene when together was presented to be just as likely as
increased looks to the distributive scene when each was presented. However, each was
the only disambiguator for which there was a significant divergence from chance in both
the each/together time window and the are carrying time window in the conjoined NP
sentences (Experiment 1). Likewise, together was the only disambiguator for which there
was a divergence from chance in both the each/together time window and the are
carrying time window in the plural NP sentences. This suggests that each is somehow
more informative than together in conjoined NP sentences, while together is more
informative in plural NP sentences.
While the distinction between “vagueness” and “ambiguity” remains weak, and
may ultimately be better characterized non-dichotomously, there are still other hallmarks
of ambiguity to investigate with the current paradigm. For instance, the literature on socalled “digging-in effects” details evidence from grammaticality judgments and RTs that,
as a period of ambiguity (say, in a garden-path sentence) is extended, the commitment to
the initial interpretation strengthens with time and is more difficult to re-analyze if wrong
(Ferreira & Henderson, 1991; Tabor & Hutchins, 2004). Interestingly, we fail to see such
strengthening of an initial interpretation in our experiments: neither the initial
commitment to the collective in Experiment 1 nor the initial commitment to the
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distributive in Experiment 2 persist into the adjectival phrase (a big red…) This could
indicate a fixation profile less consistent with ambiguity than with vagueness. We did not
have enough variability in the length of the ambiguous adjectival phrases across our
sentences to test whether ambiguity duration might affect re-analysis difficulty. It would
be interesting to examine possible digging-in effects by extending the ambiguous region
in our sentence – for instance, by adding more adjectives or disfluencies like “um, uh.” In
such a replication of Experiment 1, we would expect that an increase in the length of the
ambiguous period would not only allow for more looks to the collective scene to
“accumulate” prior to disambiguation (given the increased time in which to pursue a
collective bias), but, more importantly, a delayed or decreased “recovery” to the
distributive scene upon disambiguation. A comparison of distributive recovery profiles in
sentences with shorter ambiguities vs sentences with longer ambiguities would require a
measure of proportion of shifts in fixation rather than a proportion of fixations to the
distributive: given a fixation to the collective at time t immediately prior to distributive
disambiguation, we would expect the probability of shifting to the distributive scene at
time t+1 (arbitrary units, post-disambiguation) would decrease with longer ambiguities.
This “digging-in” dependent measure could he highly useful in further characterizing the
nature and degree of the collective bias.

Conjoined NPs and plural determiners differ in selecting between collectivity and
distributivity
There are a number of reasons why the collective interpretation should be
preferred, when, in the absence of a disambiguator, the decision arises between a
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collective and distributive meaning. For instance, under Referential Theory (Crain &
Steedman, 1985), the distributive reading might be dispreferred not only because it must
stipulate an operator, but also because it entails the existence of several distinct events.
Thus both the grammatical and conceptual semantics of distributivity are characterized as
more complex than the collective. Moreover, in both our experiments, the scenes
depicting distributive events are also superficially more complex, in that there are two
objects rather than one.
While several prevalent theories of distributivity hold that the distributive D
operator applies over the VP (Crain & Steedman, 1985; Heim et al., 1991), we find
evidence that the affordances on the subject NP may determine whether a D operator is
stipulated at the predicate. Regarding the collective affordances of conjoined NPs, Moxey
et al. (2011) found that readers were more likely to use a plural pronoun (such as they)
when completing sentence fragments involving conjoined NPs (like John and Bill arrived
at the restaurant…) than fragments introducing the same entities in separate phrases
(John arrived at the restaurant with Bill…), even though both sentences denote collective
events. That is, even when compared with unequivocally collective events like John
arrived at the restaurant with Bill, ambiguous/vague sentences beginning with a
conjoined NP like John and Bill arrived at the restaurant are more likely to prompt a
joint they anaphor. This suggests that a collective reading is (even more) preferred when
the subject NP is a conjoined NP, compared with when the collective event sentence
involves a John… with Bill construction.
Consistent with this, other studies found that readers exhibit comprehension
facilitation when members of a conjoined NP like John and Bill are referred to as they
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compared with when just one member is referred to in isolation (as in John alone)
(Albrecht & Clifton, 1998; Garrod & Sanford, 1988; Gordon, Hendrick, Ledoux, &
Yang, 1999). This provides further evidence that conjoined NPs are particularly
conducive to a collective reading, even in the absence of disambiguating information.
Thus, even though we see in the current study that collective/distributive biases emerge at
the onset of the VP, it may be the affordances of the subject NP that actually determine
whether the predicate is distributed across multiple events or considered collectively.
While Experiment 1 is congruent with the expectation that the collective scene be
preferred, Experiment 2 poses an interesting contrast. There are several possible
explanations for why the plural determiner NP The boys should differ from John and Bill
and prompt looks to the distributive scene at the onset of the verb. One possibility is that
The boys is also highly selective for a collective interpretation, so much so that the
presence of a distributive scene as an option is more salient and surprising than in the
John and Bill case. Though we have reason to believe John and Bill should be biased
towards a collective reading, the conjoined NP may yet be more accommodating of a
distributive reading than is The boys. An eye-tracking study by Patson & Ferreira (2009)
showed that participants’ parsing strategy for sentences with anaphors and reciprocal
verbs (e.g. wrestle) depended on whether the plural NP in the preceding sentence was a
conjoined NP (The trainer and the vet) or a definite plural NP (The trainers); e.g. The
trainers / The trainer and the vet were near the swamp. While they wrestled the alligator
watched them closely. Reading times (RTs) at the disambiguating region watched
indicated whether participants were garden-pathed. They found RTs were shorter at the
disambiguating region when the preceding sentence had a conjoined NP compared with
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sentences having a plural definite. Patson and Ferreira interpreted this as evidence that
conjoined NPs, more so than definite plural NPs, are Complex Reference Objects
(CROs), consisting of a representation of both (1) a single sum or group entity
(conducive to a collective reading) and (2) sets of individuals within that entity
(conducive to a distributive reading) (Barker, 1992; Moxey, Sanford, Sturt, & Morrow,
2004; Moxey et al., 2011).
It must be noted that the distributive option, however “surprising,” is not
anomalous or uninterpretable in either our conjoined NP or plural NP experiments:
participants continued to click on the “correct” scene in Experiment 2 as well as in
Experiment 1 (that is, participants clicked on the scene that matched the object(s) uttered
in the sentence, whether collective or distributive). As we saw in example 9 above (see
Introduction), though the distributive reading of sentences like The boys are carrying a
box is the marked reading, a context which defeases the collective reading of The boys
are carrying a box is certainly possible. Therefore, it seems an unsatisfactory explanation
that it is the “surprise” of seeing a distributive scene that drives the early distributive
preference in Experiment 2
Given the immediate and automatic preference for the collective we see in the
case of John and Bill, it is interesting that such a preference should be reliably overridden
in The boys by what is an ostensive dispreferred distributive reading. What could
override this semantic collective bias? The early distributive fixations in The boys
sentences may instead be due to morphosyntactic properties of the definite plural. The
definite plural NP has an explicit plural morpheme (as in the –s in The boys) where the
conjoined NP does not. As such, the definite plural may place greater focus on the
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plurality of the subject NP, if not also the event. Both intuition and the Patson & Ferreira,
2009, findings described above might tell us that it is instead the conjoined NP, by
separating and naming John and Bill explicitly, that emphasizes the individuals in the
plurality; however, we have also reviewed evidence that collective anaphors, like they,
facilitate comprehension of conjoined NPs more than do distributed references to the
individuals in the plural set (Albrecht & Clifton, 1998; Garrod & Sanford, 1988; Gordon,
Hendrick, Ledoux, & Yang, 1999). Thus, though conjoined NPs accommodate
distributive readings, they are still biased towards collective readings. We suggest that the
collective bias of the conjoined NP John and Bill arises at the level of the semantics (as
does the intuition that The boys are carrying a ball is also collective-biased), whereas the
initial distributive bias of The boys arises at the level of the morphosyntax.
Under this interpretation of the results of Experiment 2, early fixation to the
distributive is not necessarily a “commitment” to that scene’s meaning, though in the case
of Experiment 1, early looks to the collective scene may be such. If the initial distributive
fixation reflects an automatic but transient initial parse prompted by the plural -s
morpheme, then this is potentially compatible with the notion of vagueness, whereby a
subject refrains from committing to an interpretation until disambiguating information is
available. (This should not be subject to a "digging in effect," since the morphosyntactic
plurality should arise and decay independent of the duration of the (semantic) ambiguity.
Futhermore, in Experiment 2, the fact that the together condition directed looks to the
distributive scene above chance at the each/together time window, and not to the
collective scene, suggests that the initial consideration of the distributive is automatic and
is induced even in the face of contrary evidence (together being an explicit lexical125

semantic marker of the collective reading). In this case, we suggest that morphosyntactic
evidence for a plural distributive reading temporarily trumps, or is processed prior to,
semantic/pragmatic biases for a collective reading.
This interpretation is consistent with so-called “syntax-first” models of language
processing: various electrophysiological studies of language find that certain temporal
signatures of syntactic processing occur prior to lexical-semantic processes. For instance,
event-related potentials (ERPs) to syntactic violations are seen at ~125ms post stimulus
onset (Early Left Anterior Negativity (ELAN); Friederici, Pfeifer, & Hahne, 1993;
Neville, Nicol, Barss, Forster, & Garrett, 1991), while neural correlates of lexical
semantic violations are observed later at ~400ms (N400; (Marta Kutas & Hillyard, 1980;
M. Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008). Some researchers have
put forth strictly serial models, whereby syntactic and semantic processing are separately
encapsulated (Friederici, 2002), while more recent models allow that these processes are
highly interactive and parallel, but that syntactic forms facilitate processing at levels of
representation that can be accessed more rapidly at word presentation than lexical
semantic information (Boylan et al., 2014; Dikker & Pylkkanen, 2011; Dikker,
Rabagliati, Farmer, & Pylkkanen, 2010).
Conclusions and Future Directions
Taken together, these studies provide evidence of a productive distinction between two
different types of NP with regard to the interpretation of plurality. Though we find prima
facie evidence that plural determiner NPs like The boys prompt consideration of the
distributive meaning before the collective, while conjoined NPs like John and Bill favor
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the collective reading, we have reason to believe the mechanisms prompting early
fixations might be different. We propose that the early distributive preference following
The boys arises from the morphosyntactic plural –s marker, and that this preference
dissipates over the time course of the sentence, giving way later to the semantically
collective bias that is intuitive in the reading of both John and Bill are carrying a ball
and The boys are carrying a ball. Further study examining other types of definite plural
subject NPs may shed more light on the differences between definite plural and conjoined
NPs. For instance, this line of inquiry may bridge a gap between the well-established
literature on formal semantic theories of plurality and a growing body of work on
children’s acquisition of plurality and number words: there is mounting evidence that
children appear to prefer distributive readings of sentences like Two boys are pushing a
car, where adults prefer the collective interpretation (Syrett & Musolino, 2013). This will
require further study of collectivity and distributivity across various different NPs and
events.
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V. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Reviewing the aims of the dissertation
In this dissertation, I sought to demonstrate the following:
iv.

Semantic compositionality can be characterized along a “feature-vs.-function”
dichotomy in several possible dimensions (chapters 2 and 3)

v.

The AG supports various aspects of function-/relation-based composition, among
them verb-specific argument structure around events (chapter 3) and more general
thematic relation-based composition (chapter 2).

vi.

Semantic decisions on the collective or distributive representation of plural events
occur early on in sentence processing – at the verb phrase – even in the absence of
disambiguating evidence. However, the bias of this decision is largely determined
by the affordances of the subject noun phrase, and not just the verb phrase
(chapter 4).
While we refer to the typology of semantic composition in (i) as a division of
“features” vs. “functions,” this shorthand belies a longstanding dichotomy appearing
all the way from semiotics to developmental psychology. We discuss and test several
possible instantiations of the division, including taxonomic vs. thematic associations,
attributive vs. relational associations (chapter 2), object vs. event (verb) concepts
(chapter 3), and adjuncts vs. arguments (chapters 3). However, other similar
dichotomies we have not touched on include the following:
i.

Paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic distinction, where the syntagm can be said to be
a structure-sensitive combination of “this-and-this-and-this” (as are the words
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in the sentence the man cried), while the paradigm is the selection of “this-orthis-or-this” from a set of items with similar features (replacing “the man”
with “the woman” to form the sentence the woman cried). (Chandler, 2007; de
Saussure, 1916)
ii.

“vertical” vs. “horizontal” similarity distinction in language acquisition, where
horizontal similarity describes the sort of within-sentence co-occurrence
statistics toddlers could use to learn novel words (as in man cried) and also
learn thematic relationships about nouns co-occurring in the same event.
Vertical, or positional, similarity refers to words that can be used in the same
position across sentences (man and woman in the man/woman cried), and by
virtue of this are often in a similar category, sharing properties and features
(Wojcik & Saffran, 2015)

iii.

predicate modification vs. function application, which are Merge operations
over adjuncts and arguments, respectively (Heim & Kratzer, 1998)

This is by no means an exhaustive list, but we include it here to illustrate that the
fundamental “feature-function” division has been a productive one long before our
current line of research found potential neural substrates for the division. We now review
the research detailed in the above chapters on the feature-function dissociation in the
ATL and AG.
The neural bases of the feature-function division
The studies in chapters 2 and 3 focused on characterizing the role of AG in
semantic composition, contrasting this function with the manner in which left ATL might
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subserve feature-based combination (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011b; Westerlund et al.,
2015). In contrast to ATL, we find increasing evidence that AG is engaged in semantic
integration of relation-based event structure. While the current studies only investigate
cases of minimal composition – that of two words isolated from a sentence or discourse –
it is unlikely that AG and ATL are only tracking this level of composition. There is
abundant evidence that AG, for one, engages in domain-general event processing in event
structures as broad as discourse and in non-verbal depictions of events.
Indeed, both ATL and AG are best described as “hubs” at a domain-general level,
and the typology of semantic composition described in (ii) above may cleave along the
dorsal-ventral streams. As described in earlier chapters, the left ATL is a “convergence
zone” receiving heavy traffic from the ventral visual object identification pathway and
auditory “what” pathway, supporting its involvement in compositional operations over
features of object-concepts (Rauschecker & Tian, 2000). The AG is surrounded by the
dorsal spatial attention networks, the posterior temporal regions involved in motion
perception, and the anterior parietal regions involved in representing action (Kravitz et
al., 2011). This supports the conditions of AG involvement in action and event
representation. While AG may have originated as a dorsal “where/how” convergence
zone of spatial, goal-oriented, and action information, it may have been co-opted by
language to represent increasingly abstract relational information. These relations might
be learned by tracking co-occurrence statistics (“dog” often co-occurs with “bone”;
“eggs” often co-occur with “breakfast), and/or these thematic relations are learned part
and parcel of hierarchical structures arising in natural language syntax. Thus, the
emergence of event and argument structure in thought and language may have been an
130

extension of the already extant dorsal pathways underpinning action and goal
understanding.
The lateralization puzzle
Though the fronto-temporal language network appears to have become strongly
left-lateralized, it is less clear the degree to which right and left AG diverged with regard
to processing events and representing thematic relations. Chapter 2 offers evidence that
lateralization in AG did not necessarily isolate language to one hemisphere, but that the
division of labor across bilateral AG is more subtle. That left AG might be more attuned
to grammaticalized relation information (that is, information encoded directly on the
verb) is supported by the fact that left AG is sensitive to the relatively fine-grained level
of verb argument structure, and not other types of argument structure (Chapter 3). The
fact that we see activity in right AG reflecting the distinction between nongrammaticalized relational vs. attributive interpretations of nominal compounds suggests
that right AG also represents thematic relations between concepts (Chapter 2). However,
while left AG may operate within the more constrained limits of grammatically explicit
argument structure, right AG may pick up the slack in computing thematic associations
between conceptual relations that are not explicitly realized in the morphosyntax.
The AG and verb/event semantics
Chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence that AG tracks relational information
potentially tuned to verb semantics. Taken in combination with work showing that verb
valency – the number of arguments a verb can take – also modulates activity in AG, this
invites the question as to whether AG is also sensitive to number information on a subject
131

NP argument. Does the singular/plural number on a subject NP and verb modulate
activity in AG? If so, could observing patterns of AG and surrounding parietal activity
elucidate the nature of plural representation when the event could be either collective or
distributive (that is, when the subject NP could be either a group or a set of atomic
individuals)? A recent fMRI study by Boiteau, Bowers, Nair, & Almor (2014) found that
left AG was more active in response to plural subjects as compared with singular
subjects. When comparing conjoined NP sentences (e.g. Jeremy and Lucy did some work
on the house) with unconjoined NPs (Jeremy did some work with Lucy on the house),
they found that conjoined NPs elicited more activity in right AG compared with
unconjoined NPs. This is consistent with studies reviewed in chapter 4 indicating that
conjoined NPs are more likely to prompt plural anaphors like they, and as such may be
“more plural” than unconjoined NPs (Moxey et al., 2011). Given this finding, AG
activity might prove a tractable means of measuring the gradient along which collective
and distributive plurality might vary. A targeted fMRI analysis of AG activity might also
be another means of assessing whether the cardinality of The boys is more or less plural
than John and Bill (see chapter 4).
Conclusion
This dissertation introduced and motivated a framework by which to begin a
systematic typology of semantic composition. Using a range of methods, from fMRI
multi-voxel pattern analysis to eye-tracking, we were able to measure both the “where,”
and possibly also the “when,” of semantic composition. Of particular interest is the role
of AG in function-/relation-based semantic composition. It remains to be seen how left
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and right AG compare with respect to representing events and thematic relations
grammatically or otherwise. The study of the role of bilateral AG as a semantic
combinatorial hub benefits from comparison with another established “semantic hub,” the
left ATL, and continuing to study these regions as a pair is well motivated both
theoretically and empirically.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ATL and AG are at the center of a debate
over whether representations in these areas are multi-modal or amodal. Though this
dissertation did not arbitrate this particular debate, it should nonetheless make clear the
utility of modality-invariant representations in a system, such as language, that must be
both receptive and expressive in multiple modalities. While distributed semantic
knowledge could be instantiated in modality-specific, multimodal, or amodal areas,
regions involved specifically in compositional semantics are, more or less by necessity,
multimodal or amodal. After all, if we were constantly composing meanings that carried
with them fully intact sensorimotor and emotional simulations, it is not clear that we
would be able to process spoken language at the rate of 3-4 words per second (Binder &
Desai, 2011). Ultimately, it is exactly this disposition to compose which allowed the
brain to achieve the abstract symbolic system that is language.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Pearson’s r values for verb-relevant correlations in left AG

shared noun AND

50 voxels

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

0.027

0.035

0.019

0.018

0.010

-0.029

-0.0097

0.0036

0.044

0.17 *

0.056†

0.059 *

shared composition
type
(eats meat ~ with meat)
shared noun
(eats meat ~ tasty
meat)
shared verb
(eats meat ~ eats
quickly)
†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05
Table 1: Correlations in left AG between the argument-saturated (eats meat) item with
(a) an argument-saturated phrases without a verb (with meat), (b) a phrase sharing only a
noun, but not composition type or verb (tasty meat), and (c) a phrase sharing a verb but
constituting adjunct phrase (eats quickly) without argument saturation. Pairwise
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comparisons are reported using the best 50, 100, 200, and 500 voxels with highest
(unsigned) t-statistics from the composition -vs.-non-composition contrast in left AG.
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Table 2: T-tests of differences between verb- or noun-based correlations in left AG (pvalues reported)
50 voxels
shared verb vs. shared 0.092 †

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

< 0.0001 *

0.052 †

0.034 *

< 0.0001 *

0.23 ns

0.11 ns

0.051 †

0.18 ns

0.62 ns

noun
shared verb vs. shared 0.48 ns
noun +composition
shared noun vs.

0.54 ns

shared noun +
composition
†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05
Table 2: T-tests of pairwise differences between verb-sharing phrase correlations, nounsharing phrase correlations, and noun+composition phrase correlations using the best 50,
100, 200, and 500 voxels with highest (unsigned) t-statistics from the composition -vs.non-composition contrast in left AG. Correlations being contrasted are those between the
argument-saturated verb phrase “eats meat” and those phrases delineated in Table 1 of
Appendix.
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Table 3: Pearson’s r values for verb-relevant correlations in left ATL

shared noun AND

50 voxels

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

0.030

0.13 *

0.071†

0.026

0.026

0.088 *

0.052

0.042

0.027

0.023

0.012

0.037

shared composition
type
(eats meat ~ with meat)
shared noun
(eats meat ~ tasty
meat)
shared verb
(eats meat ~ eats
quickly)
†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05
Table 3: Correlations in left ATL between the argument-saturated (eats meat) item with
(a) an argument-saturated phrases without a verb (with meat), (b) a phrase sharing only a
noun, but not composition type or verb (tasty meat), and (c) a phrase sharing a verb but
constituting adjunct phrase (eats quickly) without argument saturation. Pairwise
comparisons are reported using the best 50, 100, 200, and 500 voxels with highest
(unsigned) t-statistics from composition -vs.-non-composition contrast in left ATL.
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Table 4: T-tests of differences between verb- or noun-based correlations in left ATL (pvalues reported)
50 voxels
shared verb vs. shared 0.96 ns

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

0.041 *

0.27 ns

0.92 ns

0.0050 *

0.13 ns

0.66 ns

0.13 ns

0.74 ns

0.62 ns

noun
shared verb vs. shared 0.91 ns
noun +composition
shared noun vs.

0.91 ns

shared noun +
composition
†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05
Table 4: T-tests of pairwise differences between verb-sharing phrase correlations, nounsharing phrase correlations, and noun+composition phrase correlations using the best 50,
100, 200, and 500 voxels with highest (unsigned) t-statistics from composition -vs.-noncomposition contrast in left ATL. Correlations being contrasted are those between the
argument-saturated verb phrase “eats meat” and those phrases delineated in Table 3 of
Appendix.
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Table 5: Pearson’s r values for correlations of AMT similarity norms with neural
similarity scores in left AG split by nouns and verbs
50 voxels

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

verbs

-0.10

-0.12 *

-0.096

-0.14

nouns

-0.016

0.023

-0.039

-0.028

†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05
Table 5: Comparisons of correlations between similarity norms from AMT survey of
pairwise phrase similarity (inclusive of both compositional (e.g. eats meat) and noncompositional (e.g. meat) phrases) and neural similarity norms calculated by averaging
correlations between all pairs of phrases sharing a verb and all pairs of phrases sharing a
noun (including both compositional and non-compositional phrases. Table 5 shows
those verb- and noun-based correlations in best (unsigned) 50, 100, 200, and 500 voxels
in left AG.

139

Table 6: Pearson’s r values for correlations of AMT similarity norms with neural
similarity scores in left ATL split by nouns and verbs
50 voxels

100 voxels

200 voxels

500 voxels

verbs

-0.013

0.041

0.038

0.026

nouns

-0.090

-0.097

-0.034

-0.048

†: 0.05<p < 0.1; *: p <0.05

Table 6: Comparisons of correlations between similarity norms from AMT survey of
pairwise phrase similarity (inclusive of both compositional (e.g. eats meat) and noncompositional (e.g. meat) phrases) and neural similarity norms calculated by averaging
correlations between all pairs of phrases sharing a verb and all pairs of phrases sharing a
noun (including both compositional and non-compositional phrases. Table 6 shows
those verb- and noun-based correlations in best (unsigned) 50, 100, 200, and 500 voxels
in left ATL.
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